NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

BLAME-PROOF POLICYMAKING:
CONGRESS AND BASE CLOSURES

by

Charles L. Wilson and James L. Weingartner

December 1993

Thesis Advisor: Paul N. Stockton

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704

1. AGENCY USE ONLY *(Leave blank)*	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	December 1993	Master's Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE BLAME-PROOF POLICYMAKING: CONGRESS AND BASE CLOSURES

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S) Charles L. Wilson and James L. Weingartner

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA 93943-5000

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
*A

13. ABSTRACT *(maximum 200 words)*

In contrast to the current political science literature on Congress, this thesis argues that the reelectability of Congressmen is not damaged when military bases in their districts are closed. According to Mayhew, Lindsay, and other scholars, members of Congress must prevent their bases from being closed or face "great electoral jeopardy." Nevertheless, beginning in 1987, legislators created a process that was designed to facilitate base closures. Why would they engage in such apparently suicidal behavior? Have voters actually punished the legislators that suffered base closures in their districts, as Mayhew and others would predict?

After examining the Congressional election returns from 1990 and 1992, which followed the base closure rounds of 1989 and 1991, respectively, this thesis found that base closure has *no effect* on the reelectability of members of Congress. What accounts for this finding? Although bases often do provide important economic benefits for Congressional districts, and would therefore be expected to be of critical concern to voters, Congress designed a base closure system that insulated legislators from blame if bases were closed in their own districts. The success of this "blame-proof" system has important implications for the future of the base-closing process and the larger question of how, and under what circumstances, Congress delegates power to the President.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Congress, Base Closures, Elections, Parochial Imperative, Military Facilities, Delegation of Power, Executive and Legislative Branches	15. NUMBER OF PAGES 148
	16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Blame-Proof Policymaking:
Congress and Base Closures

by

Charles L. Wilson
Major, United States Army
B.S., Cameron University, 1985

and

James L. Weingartner
Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., DePauw University, 1984

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 1993

Authors: _____
Charles L. Wilson

_____
James L. Weingartner

Approved by: _____
Paul N. Stockton, Thesis Advisor

_____
Dana P. Eyre, Second Reader

_____
Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

In contrast to the current political science literature on Congress, this thesis argues that the reelectability of Congressmen is not damaged when military bases in their districts are closed. According to Mayhew, Lindsay, and other scholars, members of Congress must prevent their bases from being closed or face "great electoral jeopardy." Nevertheless, beginning in 1987, legislators created a process that was designed to facilitate base closures. Why would they engage in such apparently suicidal behavior? Have voters actually punished the legislators that suffered base closures in their districts, as Mayhew and others would predict?

After examining the Congressional election returns from 1990 and 1992, which followed the base closure rounds of 1989 and 1991, respectively, this thesis found that base closure has *no effect* on the reelectability of members of Congress. What accounts for this finding? Although bases often do provide important economic benefits for Congressional districts, and would therefore be expected to be of critical concern to voters, Congress designed a base closure system that insulated legislators from blame if bases were closed in their own districts. The success of this "blame-proof" system has important implications for the future of the base-closing process and the larger question of how, and under what circumstances, Congress delegates power to the President.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We would like to thank the following people who were critical in the completion of this thesis: Dr. Glenn Robinson, for his encouragement in getting us to write a thesis in the first place. Dr. Paul Stockton, for sparking our interest in this subject and keeping us on track over the long haul. Dr. Dana Eyre, for helping us to make sense out of Statview. Hae-Jung Wilson and Barbara Weingartner for their patience and confidence in our ability to write this thesis.

We would like to especially thank Representative Richard K. Armey for being right and tenacious. Without his efforts, Congress might still be avoiding base closures.

We would like to dedicate this thesis to Representative William H. Natcher, whose record as a member of Congress served as an inspiration to us. Would that all members of Congress were as dedicated as he.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By 1987, a growing number of Congressmen had concluded that unnecessary military facilities ought to be closed to help cut the Federal budget deficit. However, what makes sense for the nation is not always attractive to the voters in a particular Congressional district, or to the Member who represents them in Congress. Military bases often provide large numbers of jobs to constituents. Accordingly, Mayhew, Lindsay, and other political scientists have concluded that legislators will fight to prevent base closures. Consistent with that hypothesis, Congress prevented any bases from being closed in the decade prior to 1987. Yet in that year, Congress enacted a base closing process that has since eliminated hundreds of military facilities (and many thousands of constituent jobs). How did Congress come to engage in such apparently suicidal behavior? Have voters actually punished the legislators that suffered base closures in their districts, as Mayhew and others would predict?

After examining the Congressional election returns from 1990 and 1992, which followed the base closure rounds of 1989 and 1991, respectively, this thesis found that base closure has no effect on the reelectability of members of Congress. What accounts for this finding? Although bases often do provide

important economic benefits for Congressional districts, and would therefore be expected to be of critical concern to voters, Congress designed a base closure system that insulated legislators from blame if bases were closed in their own districts. The success of this "blame-proof" system has important implications for the future of the base-closing process and the larger question of how and under what circumstances Congress delegates power to the President.

The base closure process was not the first instance in which Congress devised a way of accomplishing an important national goal that conflicted with the narrow, constituent-driven interests of many of its members. In the past, when Congress has been unable to pass necessary legislation due to concerns over constituent pressures, it has occasionally delegated powers to the President. Congress did it after the great blunder of the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 and did it in 1933 when they shifted the unpopular task of reducing veteran's benefits to President Roosevelt. Congress delegated other powers to Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson. Congress found it difficult to close bases because of the severe economic impact on the communities surrounding the bases. However, believing that base closures had to take place, Members wanted to provide for those closures without being held politically accountable.

The thesis reviews the literature on legislative behavior and the relationship of members to their electorate and examines several instances where Congress

has adopted a legislative approach similar to that of the Defense Savings Act and the subsequent creation of the BRACC.

Also covered is an examination of the historical background of base closures, the evolution of the base closure process, and an analysis of why and how Congress came to believe that the Defense Savings Act would settle the problems Congress associated with base closures. The thesis also discusses those critical steps which resulted in the passing of the Defense Savings Act of 1988 and the creation of BRACC in 1990.

A recapitulation of the data collection follows. It provides a summation of our sample, all variables incorporated for consideration, and some of those which we had considered using but later deleted. It is also a discussion of our rationale behind the selection of each of the variables and the sources that we used to build the database. Lastly, it includes our research notes delineating our methods of estimation, any particulars, and recoding requirements.

Our examination and interpretation of the analyses is divided into four subsections, which define and describe the four types of analysis used and provide the evidence to support our thesis that the reelectability of members of Congress is not hurt by base closures. On the contrary, base closures had no effect on a member's reelectability. Lastly, our analysis dispels the myth that anon-partisan commission was effecting partisan recommendations.

I. INTRODUCTION

By 1987, a growing number of Congressmen had concluded that unnecessary military facilities ought to be closed to help cut the Federal budget deficit. However, what makes sense for the nation is not always attractive to the voters in a particular Congressional district, or the Member who represents them in Congress. Military bases often provide large numbers of jobs to constituents. Accordingly, Mayhew, Lindsay, and other political scientists have concluded that legislators will fight to prevent base closures. Consistent with that hypothesis, Congress prevented any bases from being closed in the decade prior to 1987. Yet in that year, Congress enacted a base closing process that has since eliminated hundreds of military facilities (and many thousands of constituent jobs). How did Congress come to engage in such apparently suicidal behavior? Have voters actually punished the legislators that suffered base closures in their districts, as Mayhew and others would predict?

After examining the Congressional election returns from 1990 and 1992, which followed the base closure rounds of 1989 and 1991, respectively, this thesis found that base closure has *no effect* on the reelectability of members of Congress. What accounts for this finding? Although bases often do provide important economic benefits for Congressional districts, and would therefore be

expected to be of critical concern to voters, Congress designed a base closure system that insulated legislators from blame if bases were closed in their own districts. The success of this "blame-proof" system has important implications for the future of the base-closing process and the larger question of how, and under what circumstances, Congress delegates power to the President.

The base closure process was not the first instance in which Congress devised a way of accomplishing an important national goal that conflicted with the narrow, constituent-driven interests of many of its members. In the past, when Congress has been unable to pass necessary legislation due to concerns over constituent pressures, it has occasionally delegated powers to the President. Congress did it after the great blunder of the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930 and did it in 1933 when they shifted the unpopular task of reducing veteran's benefits to President Roosevelt. Congress delegated other powers to Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson. Congress found it difficult to close bases because of the severe economic impact on the communities surrounding the bases. However, believing that base closures had to take place, Members wanted to provide for those closures without being held politically accountable.

Congressmen developed legislation to set up a commission that would identify military bases to be closed to save money. The legislation was designed to thwart efforts by members to block closure of individual bases and to insulate

individual members from constituent backlash. As first introduced, the commission would have had 12 members chosen by the Secretary of Defense and Congressional leaders. This commission would have had six months to select a list of bases for closure, after which the Defense Secretary could accept any or all of the selections. All environmental regulations and any other laws that would restrict closures could be waived.

This process has worked. The reelectability of members of Congress has not been hurt by base closures after the process was implemented in 1987. Because no specific bases were discussed in the acts creating the commission, members of Congress could feel free to support them. Since the national debt was making headlines, getting rid of surplus in the military would be a popular idea in the home districts. Besides, once a base had made the list, there would be little a Congressman could do to change the base's destiny. However, there were several highly visible measures a member could take to placate his constituents. First, he could appeal to the commission not to select for closure the base(s) from his district. This would be largely ineffective, but it would make the member of Congress appear as if he is "doing something." Second, he could lobby fellow members to reject the closure list (more of the same image-enhancing powerlessness). Finally, he could try to restrict funding for the base closure, which was, like lobbying, denounced by Congressional leadership as blatantly

parochial, therefore unsuccessful, but played well at home. In essence, the reelectability of members of Congress who had bases selected for closure in either the 1989 or 1991 rounds is not substantively different than the reelectability for the rest of Congress.

Lindsay's argument that political reality demands that Congressmen obey the parochial imperative or face "electoral suicide" needs to be revised. He asserts that since nearly 60 percent of districts contain or are near military installations, and that because the Defense Department has repeatedly closed or attempted to close nu -rous installations, the fear of those Congressmen, in whose districts bases have yet to be selected for closure, would cause them to oppose any base closure to avoid setting a dangerous precedent which may come back to haunt them. However, it has not happened that way. To use Lindsay's own words, "...reelection provides members of Congress with powerful incentives to address the substance of public policy and vote their individual policy views."[1] This is especially true if they can immunize themselves from constituent retribution.

This finding suggests some broader implications. First, the base closure process is likely to proceed without legislative interference from Congress. As long as constituent pressures continue to drive Congressmen to seek defense

---

[1] James M. Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), page 138.

spending cuts, Congress can be expected to support further base closures, given the lack of voter punishment for such closures. Moreover, if Congress can manipulate the process so that individual members are rendered blame-proof, then they may be able to repeat the process when faced with other potentially dangerous issues such as reducing entitlement spending. The reduction of entitlement spending may not lend itself to the convenience of an independent commission. Unlike military bases, which are regional and affect only a portion of the population at any given time, entitlements cover a wider range of constituents. Some of the major recipients of entitlements, such as those who receive Social Security benefits, vote more often than the general public. Because of this, these voters might become a more formidable obstacle and less likely to overlook Congressional blame if their benefits were cut.

The second chapter reviews the literature on legislative behavior and the relationship of members to their electorate and examines several instances where Congress has adopted a legislative approach similar to that of the Defense Savings Act and the subsequent creation of the BRACC.

The third chapter examines the historical background of base closures, illustrates the evolution of the base closure process, and analyzes why and how Congress came to believe that the Defense Savings Act would settle the problems Congress associated with base closures. The chapter also discusses those critical

steps which resulted in the passing of the Defense Savings Act of 1988 and the creation of BRACC in 1990.

The fourth chapter recapitulates our data collection. It provides a summation of our sample, all variables incorporated for consideration, and some of those which we had considered using but later deleted. It is also a discussion of our rationale behind the selection of each of the variables and the sources that we used to build the database. Lastly, it includes our research notes delineating our methods of estimation, any particulars, and recoding requirements.

The fifth chapter is divided into four subsections. Overall, it details our examination and interpretation of the analyses, while the four subsections individually define and describe the four types of analysis used. These subsections provide the evidence to support our thesis that the reelectability of members of Congress is not hurt by base closures. On the contrary, base closures tended to have little to no effect on a member's reelectability. Lastly, this chapter dispels the myth that a non-partisan commission was effecting partisan recommendations.

II. THE PAROCHIAL IMPERATIVE AND BLAME AVOIDANCE

This chapter reviews what the literature says about how legislators act with regard to their relationship to their electorate, and examines several instances when Congress has adopted a legislative procedure similar to the type of political maneuver it accomplished with the establishment of the Defense Savings Act and the subsequent creation of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRACC).

In Congress: The Electoral Connection, David Mayhew states that "congressmen are single-minded seekers of reelection," and that their "reelection quest establishes an accountability relationship with an electorate."[2] Members of Congress have learned, over the years, that the successful congressmen were those who tended to the local problems of their constituencies[3], "bring home the bacon," as it were, or face defeat by those from home. In Congress and Nuclear Weapons, David Lindsay echoes this apparently common wisdom that parochial

---

David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pages 5-6.

James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), page 7.

interests will cause legislators to resist any moves to close military bases because base closures cause economic turmoil:

> Political reality demands that members obey the parochial imperative, regardless of the merits of DoD's case. Any other course would be electoral suicide. Entire regions of the district or state could quickly throw their support to a political opponent.[4]

Lindsay argues that the large economic impact that a base often has on an individual district (as opposed to defense contracts, which tend to be geographically diverse, thus have less impact on each affected district) causes a legislator to fear electoral defeat if the base in his district is closed. Lindsay also asserts that since nearly 60 percent of districts contain or are near military installations, and that because the Defense Department has repeatedly closed or attempted to close numerous installations, the fear of those members of Congress, in whose districts bases have yet to be selected for closure, would cause them to oppose any base closure to avoid setting a dangerous precedent which may come back to haunt them. Among the other reasons Lindsay cites as justification for opposing base closures are that closures are not equitably distributed geographically or that they are based on political rather than military reasons.

---

[4] Lindsay, page 38.

Another argument Congress has used to oppose base closures is the desire to ensure that the president does not use bases as political tools, i.e., for reward or punishment. While it is not possible to know for certain whether bases have been closed for political reasons, a number of Congressmen believe that bases have been and will continue to be so. In 1985, Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR) told the Senate: "You know why the law makes it difficult for (the Defense Department) to close a base...It is to make certain that Senators are not disciplined and chastised because they happen to disagree with the Defense Department on a crucial vote." Senator John Heinz (R-PA) said that:

> it is easy to imagine how the closing of bases, if skillfully manipulated...could be used either to influence votes or exact retribution for votes that did not turn out to be the way the administration wanted them to be...not the kind of a grant of power to a power-hungry Defense Department that this Senator wants to have any part of.

Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) summarized Senate opinion: "the fear of the exercise of untrammeled executive power is what led or what continues to fuel the support for the protections against base closing."[5] Imagined reasons for executive retribution are not limited to actions by Congress; two bases, Amarillo Air Force Base, Texas, and Newport Naval Base, Rhode Island, were ostensibly closed after their respective surrounding communities failed to support the

---

United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on Armed Services, Base Closure, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), page 21.

President in reelection bids.[6] The idea of executive retribution may account for the reason that most Congress members who had no bases in their districts would support controls on closures.

A third reason why members oppose base closures is the severe economic impact on the surrounding communities. Lindsay maintains:

> Frequently several towns depend on the well being of the base. A decision to close or realign a military installation can literally turn the surrounding communities into ghost towns as base personnel leave, related businesses collapse, and the tax base dries up.[7]

Speaking in opposition to the Defense Savings Act in 1988, Representative "Sonny" Montgomery (D-MS) summed it up by saying, "I don't really need any more people on welfare in my state...the military bases are a good economic measure for my people."[8]

As Lindsay points out in Congress and Nuclear Weapons, not only do Congressmen vote to protect their own parochial interests; rather they often set

---

[6] Ibid., page 27. Amarillo, which was closed in 1968, was done so supposedly as the result of failing to support President Johnson in the 1964 presidential election. The rumor in Newport, which was severely cut back in 1973, was that the electorate had failed to back President Nixon in 1972.

[7] Lindsay, pages 137-8.

[8] 1988 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 444.

agendas and vote on issues based on their own individual ideologies and their conceptions of the national interest:

> ...congressional deference and parochialism play a subsidiary role in Congress's deliberatons....What best explains congressional decision making are the personal policy preferences of individual members. Simply put, no theory that ignores the policy beliefs of legislators will work well in explaining congressional behavior. And recognizing the importance of personal policy preferences does not require any heroic assumptions about what motivates members of Congress. Legislators are not angels; for most the overriding goal is to be reelected. But contrary to conventional wisdom, reelection provides members of Congress with powerful incentives to address the substance of public policy and vote their individual policy views. This is the genius of the American political system.[9]

Even though Congress felt that it was politically dangerous to allow bases to close, they also knew that it had to be done. As Representative Dave McCurdy (D-OK) stated during a HASC Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee meeting:,

> ...we have to be fair in these things....we are sometimes too afraid because...the National Taxpayers Union...or the newspapers...are going to say, "These congressmen are just concerned about the bases in their district." That's baloney. People here are interested in developing a policy that makes sense.[10]

---

[9] Lindsay, page xii.

[10] United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on Armed Services, Base Closure, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), page 61.

The policy made sense, they felt, because it had to be done if they were going to be able to cut back on the nation's expenditures. As Representative Dick Armey (R-TX) expressed,

> ...the Federal budget deficit is extremely serious, and the particular financial squeeze facing our Armed Forces is even more profound. Saving money by closing or realigning unnecessary military bases may be a difficult task, but it is one whose time has come. The potential savings are enormous.[11]

Representative Armey's statement was echoed by Arthur Ravenel Jr., (R-SC), "It seems to me given the financial fix our country is in, this is a legislation whose time has come."[12] However, the parochial imperative prevented them from accomplishing the task. So, they resorted to delegating their powers away, an act not so uncommon as it first appears. Congress has engaged in this type of maneuver before.

The reasons for Congressional maneuvers of delegating away power fall into two categories: "We cannot do the job," and "We do not want to be held politically responsible." The first describes a situation whereby Congress has been unable to pass necessary legislation without concerning itself with debts to special interests and the parochial imperative or it simply does not have the tools or personnel to accomplish the job for which it has responsibility. The second

---

11

Ibid., page 15.

12

Ibid., page 55.

describes a situation in which Congress has backed off from political "hot potatoes" because it feared retribution at the hands of its electorate.

When Congress has determined it "could not do the job" with regards to tariff and spending, it has delegated these important powers to the President. Likewise, when the legislators have found themselves too vulnerable to pressures from special interests and the voting public, and have concluded that the retention of certain powers involved too great a political cost, they have also deferred to the Executive.[13] The Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930, which raised tariff rates to record levels, was widely condemned as a monstrosity of legislative tariff-making because the retaliatory tariffs of foreign nations caused a sharp decline in United States foreign trade. Senator David I. Walsh said at the time that if bartering at the ballot had not taken place, then "some other invisible influence has brought about a shifting of votes and reversals of judgement that is unparalleled in the history of legislation." Senator Robert M. La Follette (R-WI) spoke of legislators in the hands of lobbyists, "Votes were changed overnight...for the conferring of new privileges upon favored interests." Congress learned its lesson: Being responsible also means risking blame. Every award given out is also a risk, because it must sometimes be denied. If the

---

[13] Louis Fisher, President and Congress: Power and Policy, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), page 66.

Congress member cannot meet the demands, then he may be glad to give up a significant portion of his power. This is just what Congress did; it delegated its tariff-making powers to the President.[14]

When Congress finds itself in the position of having to do something which it perceives must be done, but which is potentially hazardous, either to the members of Congress themselves or to the greater interests of the United States, it devises measures to immunize itself from harm. In 1933, for example, there were thousands of individuals on the rolls of the Veteran's Bureau drawing compensation to which they were not entitled. The Veteran's Committee could not figure out a way to get these names off the list, so Congress shifted the unpopular task to President Roosevelt, who subsequently received authority to reduce veteran's benefits and federal salaries as well. When some legislators complained that Roosevelt was becoming dictatorial, Senator Millard E. Tydings responded, "Of course...Congress refused to do its duty."[15]

Congress has also shown an unwillingness to be held politically accountable for questions of national security and military preparedness. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson were granted powers beyond those allowed

---

[14] Ibid., page 67.

[15] Ibid., page 68.

by the Constitution when they announced a policy and sought legislative approval at the same time. The Truman Doctrine, The Eisenhower Doctrine, and Johnson's Tonkin Gulf Resolution, respectively, were announced by the same dramatic method - a special message to Congress - which thus committed the United States in the eyes of the world and imposed on Congressmen who did not support the President's stand a heavier responsibility than most were willing to assume.[16] Congress showed similar acquiescence in 1933 for President Roosevelt's "war" against the great depression and for President Johnson's "war" on poverty in 1964.[17]

In 1967, in the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act, Congress established a commission to recommend pay levels for its members, among other federal officials. The commission was directed to report its recommendations to the President, who could modify or accept the pay rate proposals and then send them to Congress. The recommendations would become law unless Congress enacted other pay rates or either house disapproved the proposals within 30 days. During debate, several legislators tried to discredit the plan to delegate authority to the President to decide the pay rates for Congressmen, but most

---

Francis O. Wilcox, Congress, The Executive, and Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pages 106-7.

Fisher, pages 74-77.

members thought it a convenient way to render themselves blame-proof. Representative Chet Holifield (D-CA) said a vote by Congress for a raise in wages would bring on accusations of conflict in interest. Congress had again devised measures to immunize itself from political accountability.[18]

The situation of base closures falls, interestingly, into both categories. Congress was not able to close bases because of the severe economic impact on the communities surrounding the bases. However, believing that base closures had to take place, it did not also want to be held politically accountable for the closures. The political maneuver Congress used to solve its dilemma (the establishment of the Defense Savings Act and the subsequent creation of the BRACC), closely resembles the political shell game known as the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967. Just as in 1967, a commission was established and was directed to report its recommendations to the President. Unlike the 1967 act, which he could modify, the President must accept or reject the proposals and then send them to Congress. The recommendations would become final unless Congress rejected them *in toto*. Again, most members of Congress found it a convenient way to render themselves blame-proof.

In conclusion, the literature portrays the members of Congress as having an accountability relationship with their electorate; successful congressmen tend to

---

[18] Ibid., page 69.

the local problems of their constituencies. Furthermore, these parochial interests will cause legislators to resist any moves to close military bases because base closures cause economic turmoil in the communities surrounding the bases. Although Congress felt that it was politically dangerous to allow bases to close, Congress also knew that bases had to be closed, if the nation was going to be able to cut back on expenditures. Inasmuch as the parochial imperative prevented Congress from accomplishing the task, it overcame this predicament by resorting to the not so uncommon act of delegating away Congressional powers. Congress had engaged in this type of maneuver before, and as before, Congress got what it wanted done and distanced itself from liability.

III. HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURES

This chapter reviews the history of base closure processes, beginning with the 1960's and Congress' unsuccessful attempt to regulate closures in 1965. It then examines Congress' second failed attempt to regulate closures in 1976 and its subsequent success in the following year. Lastly, it describes the crucial steps that led to the Defense Savings Act of 1988 and the creation of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission.

Prior to the mid-1960's, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara set about the "most extensive base realignment and closure in the history of the United States."[19] He and his Pentagon "whiz kids" initiated an aggressive cost cutting drive that would eventually effect hundreds of sites throughout the country. Among these were 60 major installations the Defense Department intended to completely shut down and eliminate from its inventory.[20] The Secretary of

---

19

Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, Base Realignments and Closures, (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), page 8.

20

United States Department of Defense, Base Closure and Realignment Report, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), page 167.

Defense was essentially free to close bases at will, with little or no consultation with either the military departments or Congress, although "members of the defense committees apparently used their positions to deter the Defense Department from closing bases in their districts."[21] In fact, over 125 Army and Air Force bases were closed between 1952 and 1974[22]; 100 Army, Navy, and Air Force bases were closed between 1961 and 1977.[23] Congress had not anticipated these broad actions or their considerable political effect and, with very few exceptions, negatively viewed closure actions.[24]

Congress rose up in arms. It had not been in session when the Defense Department made its public announcement immediately after the 1964 elections and, even though the massive restructuring would directly effect the lives (and

---

21

R. Douglas Arnold, Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), pages 95-128, cited by James M. Lindsay, Congress and Nuclear Weapons, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pages 133-4.

22

Arnold in Lindsay, page 134.

23

United States Department of Defense, President's Economic Adjustment Committee, Office of Economic Adjustment, 25 Years of Reuse: Summary of Completed Military Base Economic Adjustment Projects, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), page 1.

24

United States Department of Defense, Base Closure and Realignment Report, (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), pages 167-70.

probably votes) of thousands of constituents, McNamara virtually excluded the legislature from his decision process.[25] Charges abounded from Congress that the Johnson Administration was engaged in political deviltry and the two branches of government readied to fight over which would eventually control base closures.

The first attempt to establish formal Congressional control over base closure procedures came in Congress' very next session in 1965. A provision of the fiscal year (FY) 1966 Military Construction Authorization Bill gave either chamber 70 days to veto any proposal to close or "substantially" reduce any base. House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC) claimed that Congress' stand on the issue was a defense of its constitutional authority to raise and support armies. He argued that since Congress provided money to establish bases, it should have a role in closing them; to do less than that was tantamount to being the President's "rubber stamp." Congressman Lucien D. Nedzi (D-MI) expressed an opposing view that the bill was "directed at subsidizing the economies of communities possessing unneeded military facilities." The Senate deleted the provision, stating that it was an "unwise" intervention into the Secretary of Defense's exclusive power to determine how to

---

25

Sandra A. Dougherty, Army Base Closures: A Status Report, AUSA Background Report #35, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 1991), page 1.

provide the "effective, efficient, and economical administration of the armed forces." The conference report replaced the requirement for notifying Congress, changing the required notice to 120 days, but left out the Congressional veto of closure plans.[26]

President Johnson vetoed the bill. In his message to Congress, he said that the Attorney General's study of the bill found it to be a "fundamental encroachment" of the separation of powers between the President and Congress, which would "substantially inhibit" his ability to execute his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief. President Johnson objected to the idea that closures could not occur when Congress was not in session and that he had restricted flexibility in determining missions for bases. He also expressed objection to the constraint on economic use of defense resources and further that he would "be concerned about the cumulative erosion of the executive power by legislation."[27]

The revised FY 1966 Military Construction Authorization Bill replaced the objectionable base closure provision with one that required 30 days notice (with justification) to HASC and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) before closing any base employing more than 250 people. The HASC report on the bill

---

[26] 1965 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965), pages 689-701.

[27] Ibid., page 701.

noted that Congress should concern itself with approval of base closures and also refuted President Johnson's claim that Congress was not equipped to examine such details of execution of the laws and other executive branch functions. Five committee members with bases in their districts urged the House to attempt to override the President's veto as a matter of principle, but no individual or group in Congress attempted such an override.[28] The bill became law.

Congress placed an additional restriction on base closures in 1966. The 1965 bill required 30 days notice to HASC and SASC, whether or not Congress was in session. The FY 1967 Military Construction Authorization Bill required at least 30 days of continuous session of Congress between fully-justified notification and closure of any base with more than 250 personnel. President Johnson criticized this provision when he signed the bill and promised to push for revision if the restrictions hampered defense efforts.[29]

Although President Johnson was concerned about Congressional encroachment on executive privilege, Congress seemed content that the provisions of the fiscal 1967 Military Construction Authorization Bill did not

---

[28] Ibid., pages 701-2.

[29] 1966 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pages 311-13.

restrict the closing of bases. Between 1970 and 1983, during a period when the military labor force declined by almost 25 percent[30], the number of bases closed represented less than ten percent of the Defense Department's inventory.[31] Most of these closures occurred as a result of the post-Vietnam draw down.[32] However, by 1976, a coalition of northeastern and midwestern Congressmen was once again questioning the Defense Department's base closure methods, specifically the criteria for selection. They alleged the selections for closure were politically motivated and that their regions were suffering a disproportionate share of the closures.

One example of the type of base being closed was Loring Air Force Base (Strategic Air Command), a remote bomber base in northern Maine. By 1975, Loring had become a liability for several reasons. Militarily, it was susceptible to attack by submarine launched missiles; economically, it was expensive to maintain because of the additional personnel needed to clear the yearly average

---

30

Hoffman, Mark S., ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1993, (New York: Pharos Books, 1993), pages 692-4.

31

Donald C. Rasher, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Closing Military Bases to Generate Cost Savings and Increase Military Efficiency, (Washington, DC: National War College, 1986), page 4.

32

Ibid.

of ten feet of snow from its runways. When the Air Force proposed reducing it by 72 percent, Representative William Cohen (R-ME) spoke out against it. Cohen was especially interested in the detrimental impact the closing of Loring would have on the community which had developed around the base. He went to House Majority Leader Thomas P. O'Neill (D-MA) in an attempt to stop this claimed infringement.[33]

O'Neill advanced an amendment to the FY 1977 Weapons Procurement Bill that would have forbidden reductions exceeding 50 percent of any base unless Congress had been notified before 15 March 1973. This amendment would have halted the Ford Administration's recently announced plans to close or reduce operations at 160 installations. Supporters of the amendment claimed that the previous base closures had been decided by individual discretion and that the Defense Department had unsystematic methods to determine savings. They claimed this amendment ensured that total economic impact would be considered in the base closing decision process. Several members, including noted proponents of reduced defense spending, spoke in favor of the amendment; 96 members who had voted to delay funding for the B-1 bomber voted for it. Military Installations Subcommittee Chairman Richard Ichord (D-

---

[33] Edward F. Gordon, Captain, USN, Base Closure and Realignment, A Case Study, (Washington, DC: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992), page 5.

MO) opposed the amendment because it "would require the operation of our defense forces not for the primary purpose of defending the United States, but for the economic concerns of local, self-serving interests." The amendment was defeated.[34]

Base closures were also a topic of heated debate during floor action on the FY 1977 Military Construction Bill. Now Speaker of the House O'Neill put forth a similar amendment to the one on the Defense Procurement Bill. This amendment would bar closure of a base with more than 500 civilian employees or a reduction of more than 50 percent of the civilian work force of any installation unless Congress received a one year advance notice and detailed justification was provided to HASC and SASC. Supporters of the proposed amendment claimed that the Pentagon estimates of savings failed to account for training and construction at other bases and the increased spending of other federal agencies after closure, e.g., unemployment insurance. They also claimed that closures and realignments were often intended to appease senior congressmen whose districts benefitted from the changes. Representative Cohen, who co-sponsored the bill, rejected criticism that the amendment would politicize the base closure process, claiming that "the defense posture of the United States frequently plays a secondary role in the determination of what

---

[34] 1976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, pages 283-4.

base to emasculate or close." Military Installations Subcommittee Chairman Ichord said that he could accept the amendment, but raised concerns about conflict with the principle of separation of powers.

Opponents of the proposed amendment warned that the Defense Department might choose to maintain unneeded bases rather than face the political obstacles this provision would create. Representative Bill Frenzel (R-MN) said, "We might as well call it an anti-taxpayer amendment, because any time we wanted to save some money for the taxpayers of this country, we would not be able to do so if it had an impact on one of our districts and the representative of that district did not like it." Representative Elford A. Cederberg (R-MI), the ranking Republican on the Appropriations Committee, noted the apparent hypocrisy of members who "have been consistently condemning the Defense Department, voting against appropriations for defense, voting against authorizations for defense, and all of a sudden a small installation in their district is involved and they complain." Attempts to reduce the reporting requirement to 60 days and then six months failed, and both the amendment and the Military Construction Bill were passed.[35]

SASC proposed legislation which would provide a permanent procedure (rather than the House-proposed one-time measure) which would affect closure

---

[35] Ibid., pages 313-14.

or reduction of over 50 percent of any base with 250 or more civilians. The appropriate service secretary would notify Congress, providing rationale and an estimate of the impact on affected employees and the local community. Congress would then have nine months to take a closer look, after which time the service secretary would inform HASC and SASC of his intent to proceed and would detail "the estimated fiscal, economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences." Lastly, Congress would have an additional 90 days to consider this information to "remedy the decision, if warranted." The conference report was similar to the Senate proposal except that it applied to bases with 500 or more civilian employees, and that it would apply for only five years.[36]

President Ford vetoed the bill. In his message to Congress, he stated that existing base closure and realignment procedures already complied with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)[37] and adequately took "into account all other relevant considerations, and afford(ed) extensive opportunity

---

[36] Ibid., pages 314-16.

[37] One of the important stipulations of this act imposed Environmental Impact Statements on all undertakings that called for federal funding. These impact statements required the activity making a change to address what effects the proposed project would have on the community over a range of concerns from environmental to economic.

for public and Congressional involvement." The "arbitrary time limit and set of requirements" would, he said, "generate a budgetary drain on the defense dollar which should be used to strengthen our military capabilities" and would "result in waste and inefficiency at the expense of meeting our essential military requirements." He also objected to its "attempt to limit my powers over military bases."[38]

The House voted to override the veto 270-131, but the Senate failed 51-42. HASC reported a revised bill which contained no base closure provision, stating that the need to pass an authorization bill took precedence over its strong concern for the base closure issue. SASC considered an amendment by Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D-ME) and ten cosponsors which would have barred closing any base with 500 or more civilian employees or reducing the civilian work force at a base by more than 1000 persons or 50 percent before: (1) Congress had been notified in writing, (2) justification had been submitted to HASC and SASC, (3) NEPA terms had been met, (4) the Defense Department's Office of Economic Adjustment had consulted with other federal agencies to consider alternate uses of affected facilities, and (5) a 90 day delay had passed. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld objected to the amendment, claiming the 90 day delay would cost 35 to 40 million dollars, and that the provision for

---

[38] 1976 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 21-A.

economic readjustment planning was unnecessary and unwanted. The SASC version only required a 60 day delay before a base realignment, with no provision for economic readjustment planning. Both chambers passed the Senate version and President Ford reluctantly signed it.[39]

It was not until the Carter Presidency that Congress would get control. In 1977, Congress again moved to restrict base closures. Representative Cohen put forth an amendment to the fiscal 1978 Weapons Procurement Bill which would make permanent the requirement for the Defense Department to inform Congress and to provide detailed justification 60 days in advance of closure of any base with at least 500 civilian employees or reduction of the civilian work force by at least 1000 persons or 50 percent. This amendment was rejected.[40] The SASC placed a similar provision in the Military Construction Authorization Bill, but it would only affect closure of bases with at least 1000 workers.[41] The conference report made permanent the provisions of the revised FY 1967 Military Construction Bill[42] by adding Section 2687 to Title 10, United States

---

39

Ibid., pages 317-18.

40

1977 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 337.

41

Ibid., page 343.

42

Code (10 USC 2687), which required that before any installation with at least 500 civilians be closed or any installation have its civilian work force reduced by at least 1000 persons or 50 percent, whichever was less, the following had to occur: (1) The HASC and the SASC had to be informed in writing, (2) NEPA conditions had to be met, (3) Detailed justification for the decision, including statements of the estimated fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of the proposed closure or realignment had to be submitted to the HASC and the SASC, and (4) Before any irrevocable action to effect or implement the decision took place, a delay period of 60 days had to pass. President Carter signed the bill into law.[43]

The NEPA and 10 USC 2687 effectively served to check any further base closures or realignments due to the inability of the military departments to meet all of the regulatory requirements while at the same time trying to opportunely resolve the political consequences.[44] The Defense Department could no longer streamline its base structure. Congress had control.

---

[43] Ibid., page 345.

United States Congress, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Construction and Stockpiles, Department of Defense Base Realignment Policy, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1978), pages 17-18.

[44] Base Closure and Realignment Report, pages 167-168.

In 1981, President Reagan's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, popularly known as the Grace Commission, submitted its formal report to the President. Among other issues, the Commission reasserted that the Defense Department could certainly realize significant savings through a comprehensive adjustment in its military base structure. Foreseeing the potential for political impasse, the commissioners recommended the creation of an independent, unconstrained by politics, base realignment and closure commission to set upon the issue and develop proposals.[45] President Reagan accepted the report, but took no immediate action to implement the recommendation. One of the early policy initiatives that Reagan did undertake was the "National Debt Retirement Act of 1982," a proposed bill to sell surplus federal real property and to use the proceeds to help retire the national debt.[46] He also issued Executive Order

---

45

Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, Base Realignments and Closures, (Washington, DC: 1988), page 9.

46

United States Congress, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, National Debt Retirement Act of 1982, House Document No. 97-240, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1982), page 1, cited by Charles E. Cassidy, A Study of the Domestic Base Closure Process From the 1980's to the Present, (Gainsville, FL: University of Florida, 1992), page 2.

12348, which established the Property Review Board, the purpose of which was to identify and make easier the prompt sale of surplus federal properties.[47]

The Reagan Administration's massive defense buildup brought major changes to U.S. military force structure, but virtually left unchanged basing, resulting in underproductivity and waste. Some units were reformed with their subordinate units dispersed over a vast area, bringing about command and control problems. Others were stationed at bases which could no longer support their training needs, such as the Army brigade with a Central Europe contingency mission which was based and trained in the West Texas desert.[48]

After the peak in military spending in the 1980's, both the executive and legislative branches recognized the excesses in defense installations, and although both Congress and the Defense Department gave much attention to base closures in 1985, little of real substance took place. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), upon taking over as Chairman of the SASC in January 1985, stated that "one of the best ways to approach the seemingly higher cost of

---

[47] United States Congress, 98th Congress, 1st Session, Oversight of GSA's Federal Surplus Real Property Disposal Program, Senate Document No. 98-655, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), page 4, cited by Charles E. Cassidy page 3.

[48] Hugh R. Leonard, Jr., Colonel, USA, Handling the Hot Potato: Evolution and Analysis of the Base Closing Decision Process, (Washington, DC: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992), page 4.

Defense would be to close some of the bases that are no longer needed."[49] The Committee started to look at this issue and, in April 1985, indicated a belief that the Defense Department should "consider and propose for closure bases that put an excessive drain on already limited resources."[50]

The Defense Department reaction to this recommendation was to examine closely and consider base closures as a way to economize operations. However, because of the substantial one-time costs involved in closing bases, estimated to average $125 million per installation, the Defense Department decided in March 1985 to recommend no closure activities as part of the FY 1986 budget.[51]

By 1985, the political realities of the budget deficit and the effects of the O'Neill-Cohen amendments led several members to reconsider the base closure process. Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) put forth an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill which would allow the Defense Department to waive the

---

49

Press Release, Senator Barry Goldwater, Chairman Senate Committee on Armed Services, "Military Base Closures," 5 March 1985, cited in Donald C. Rasher, page 5.

50

United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Report 99-41 to accompany S. 1029, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 29 April 1985), page 232, in Donald C. Rasher, page 6.

51

Joint Statement by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Senator Barry Goldwater, "Base Closures," March 1985, in Donald C. Rasher page 6.

requirements of 10 USC 2687 in any year that the federal budget was in deficit. Floor and committee debate centered on the members' fear of politically motivated base closures. As a result, the Gramm amendment was pulled and the Defense Department continued to be rendered powerless in its efforts to close bases.[52]

The fiscal decision to close bases did not occur during the Reagan Presidency. Critics say that the weight of "pork" was not the only reason that bases were not closed during the Reagan years. Some argue that the Reagan Administration thought it politically foolish to seek base closures at a time when military expenditures were expanding at record pace.[53] To maintain support for these tremendous military costs, the administration thought it best to "leave the 'pork' in Congress and let the sleeping dog of base closures continue to lie."[54]

52

United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on Armed Services, Base Closure, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), pages 20-21.

53

Mike Mills, "Members Go on the Offensive to Defend Bases," Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 2 July 1988, page 1816.

54

William E. Lewellyn, Colonel, USA, An Examination of Congressional Motives for Impacting on Military Strategy, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1991), page 6.

It was into an almost desperate fiscal atmosphere in 1987 that Representative Richard Armey (R-TX) introduced a new approach to base closures. The estimates at the time were that nearly ten percent of the Defense Department's 312 major domestic bases were simply unneeded.[55] Armey, a Republican second-term member with a Ph.D. in economics, introduced an amendment to the FY 1988 Defense Authorization Act which would have established a 12 member bipartisan commission to recommend a list of bases, any or all of which the Secretary of Defense could close or realign "regardless of any other provision of law."[56] The amendment was initially approved by 15 votes, but "the Democratic leadership froze the clock and then switched enough votes to kill it"[57] by seven votes.

A brief history on Armey here might shed some light on how a relatively junior Representative could put forth such an important piece of legislation. In 1984, Armey, an economics professor, decided, while watching C-SPAN on television, that he could do as well or better than the Congressmen he observed.

55

Phil Kuntz, "House Panels Differ Over Base-Closing Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 11 June 1988, page 1619. A *major* base is defined as one with at least 300 employees.

56

1987 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 238.

57

"Defense Cuts That Won't Hurt Defense," New York Times, 23 October 1987.

He sought and got his party's nomination unopposed because no one thought the Democratic incumbent could be unseated. Armey campaigned using a comic book which articulated his free-market views. After his upset victory, came to Washington with so little personal money that he at first slept in the House Gym and later on his office couch. Armey is said to have "fine political instincts" and is not afraid to rile constituents (he opposed the parental leave bill as "yuppie welfare") or ranking politicians (Education Chairman William Ford called him "a pain in the ass"). Armey's incisive ideas and an understanding of how to sell them coupled with his political antennae and tenacious sniping ensured that the military base closing bill became "his first major achievement."[58]

Armey, who was buoyed by countless newspaper and magazine articles supporting the idea[59], continued his efforts by discussing the issue with other House members and Defense Department officials and by reintroducing the concept as a separate bill (H.R. 1583) on 12 March 1988. The bill had 110 cosponsors. After the storm of editorial support for Armey's concept, Congressional leadership finally began to support the idea; the idea was backed

---

58

Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1994, (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1993), pages 1269-70.

59

Papers such as the Dallas Times-Herald, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Washington Post, and others rallied to support the idea of a commission after Armey's failed attempt in 1987.

by Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), HASC Chairman, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), SASC Chairman, and Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci. In spite of the 110 cosponsors and the heavyweight support , he met with political interference. Representative Jack Brooks (D-TX), Government Operations Committee Chairman, claimed his committee had jurisdiction over the bill because Armey's plan included the sale of federal land. Representative Walter B. Jones (D-NC), Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee Chairman, made a similar claim since the bill would waive the environmental impact study required for base closure. The chief complaint to the bill was that Congress would have no control over the commission's actions, notwithstanding Congressional appointment of ten of the twelve commission members.[60]

In the interim, HASC Chairman Aspin and Representative William L. Dickinson (R-AL), Ranking Minority Member, were working with SASC Chairman Nunn and Secretary of Defense Carlucci on a similar bill. Their plan differed in that the Defense Secretary would select the commission, instead of Congress selecting ten of twelve, as in Armey's original proposal. After much consideration, Armey withdrew H.R. 1583 and, on 28 April, introduced H.R.

---

[60] The commission would have consisted of three members appointed by the Speaker of the House and three appointed by the Senate Majority Leader; two members appointed by the House Minority Leader and two by the Senate Minority Leader; and two members appointed by the Secretary of Defense.

4481 with Aspin and Dickenson as cosponsors. Nunn put forth a companion amendment to the SASC FY 1989 Defense Authorization Bill on 27 April.[61]

These two amendments would create a seven member commission selected by the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with leaders of Congress. The commission would have six months to determine which bases should be closed and report these to the Defense Secretary. He would then have 15 days to accept or reject the entire list. Supporters claimed that these amendments would remove politics from the base closure and realignment process. Opponents maintained that the amendments went too far; Congress would be removed from the decision-making process. Senator Alan J. Dixon (D-IL), SASC Military Construction Subcommittee Chairman, put forth an amendment which (1) would allow Congress to veto the closure list after the Secretary of Defense had approved it, (2) would expand the commission to 15 members, (3) would require the Secretary of Defense to consult Congressional military subcommittee chairmen and national associations of state and local officials, (4) would require the commission membership to reflect a "reasonable" geographic balance, and (5) would direct that senior committee staff not be employed by the Department of Defense. The amendment was adopted on 10 May. Three days later, the Senate adopted an amendment by Senator Bumpers,

---

[61] 1988 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 440.

which required the commission to consider the costs to the entire federal government, and State and local governments, not only to the Defense Department, in deciding which bases to close.[62]

Four versions of H.R. 4481 (one each from the four interested committees: Armed Services, Government Operations, Merchant Marine & Fisheries, and Rules) reached the floor on 7 July. After five days of debate, Armey put forth a substitute amendment of his own to replace all four versions since committee alterations had "radically changed" the original bill. Armey's revision had some notable differences from his original bill: It allowed Congress to vote to disapprove the closure list, and would require adherence to environmental regulations during the base closure process but not during consideration by the committee. After one amendment requiring that not more than half of the commission's staff be employed by the Defense Department, the Armey revision passed the House by 37 votes.[63]

On 5 October the Senate-House conferees agreed to a compromise version of the legislation. Their report easily passed both chambers a week later. Members of both parties called the report "a rare instance of Congressional willingness to

---

[62] Ibid., pages 440-1.

[63] Ibid., pages 445-7.

subordinate constituency interests in preserving local payrolls to a broader national interest in trimming the budget deficit."[64]

On 29 December 1989, after eight months of deliberation, the commission announced its recommendations. It listed 86 bases for closure, 13 of them major. Five more were to be partially closed and 54 additional bases would gain or lose personnel through realignment. The commission estimated annual savings of nearly $700 million leading to a 20-year savings of $5.6 billion.[65] Those members who lost bases predictably complained about the selection process, claiming that the bases in their districts had been unfairly picked. Their cries were, as planned, in vain. House Joint Resolution 165, which would have disapproved the commission results, was overwhelmingly defeated 381-41. The bill was sponsored by Representative George E. Brown, Jr. (D-CA), whose district lost both George and Norton Air Force Bases.[66]

Members who lost bases from their districts tried to stop the closure process by restricting funding for the closures. Opponents of funding the closures were led by Representatives Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA), who

---

[64] 1988 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 447.

[65] Ibid., pages 447-9.

[66] 1989 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 470.

were fighting to save the Presidio of San Francisco, and were supported by Representative Jack Murtha (D-PA), Chairman, Defense Appropriations Subcommittee (HADS), whose district contained the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, a potential victim of any future base closure selections. The HADS version of the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Bill would prevent spending any money on closure until the General Accounting Office (GAO) confirmed that the required savings would occur within six years. HASC members complained that this move was in violation of the 1988 base closure law so the objectional wording was cut. Pelosi and Boxer had planned to put forth a separate amendment to block funds to close the Presidio of San Francisco; they gave up the idea when the Murtha language was removed. The Senate Appropriations Committee, led by Senator Dixon, whose constituents in the area surrounding Chanute Air Force Base were backing him with an unrestrained advertising campaign, attempted to add language similar to that which was removed by the House. This endeavor also met with defeat. Lastly, the Senate Appropriations Committee attempted to cut the authorization from $500 million to $300 million and to handle the issue in the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee instead of in the Military Construction Subcommittee, as the House had done. However,

the Senate yielded both points to the House in conference and the full amount was appropriated.[67]

When Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney proposed on 29 January 1990 to eliminate 35 additional domestic bases in FY 1991, the issue once again moved to the front of many congressmen's plates. The Democrats immediately complained that the selections were politically motivated; 29 of the 35 bases were in the districts of Democratic members. Representative Pat Schroeder (D-CO), Chairwoman, HASC Military Installations Subcommittee, said that "instead of producing a comprehensive force structure plan, which included base closures, Secretary Cheney has produced an unbalanced, partisan hit list." Secretary Cheney insisted that he did not change the list provided to him by the individual services.[68]

HASC Chairman Aspin recommended forming another commission to settle the problem. Although Cheney was "certainly willing to consider" Aspin's proposal, he ventured that "the intelligent way to proceed is to let me manage the department."[69]

---

67 Ibid., pages 471-3.

68 1990 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, page 694.

69 Ibid.

HASC reported the FY 1991 Defense Authorization Bill with a ban on any new closures. Cheney countered with a caution that he would urge President Bush to veto the bill unless it were modified. The House passed the authorization bill prohibiting closures until the Defense Department proposed a non-partisan method for selecting bases for closure. Initially, SASC wanted to remove barriers to base closures, but the announced list prompted Senator Bumpers to put forth an amendment to bar domestic base closures and to require the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on the proposed organization and size of U.S. forces through FY 1996. SASC Chairman Nunn objected; the amendment would, he said, "send a signal to the American people that the Congress has a lot of rhetoric in terms of cutting defense expenditures, but...we are not willing (to close bases)." The amendment was defeated 54-43.[70]

The conference report created a permanent eight member commission, selected by the Secretary of Defense and confirmed by the Senate, which would recommend bases for closure and realignment in 1991, 1993, and 1995. As in the Defense Savings Act of 1988, both the Secretary of Defense and Congress would have to accept or reject each list without modification. A Congressional vote to reject the list would be subject to presidential veto, which would, in turn, require a two-thirds majority to override and stop the base closing process. Although

---

[70] Ibid., pages 694-5.

the Bush Administration was opposed to Senate confirmation of commission members, the President signed the bill on 5 November 1990.[71]

The reason Congress overcame its antipathy to base closures between 1975 and 1987 was concern for the national debt, which had more than tripled during the Reagan Presidency. It had grown from $907.7 billion in 1980 to $2.8574 trillion in 1989.[72] This incredible growth in the national debt led Congress to think that the public wanted action, i.e., decreases in spending which, in turn, led to the most vulnerable target for cuts - defense spending. Big reductions in defense spending could be achieved by closing bases. Representative Joe Barton, (R-TX) summed it up on the House floor:

> ...there are over 4,000 military bases in this country. It is estimated that if we pass the Armey substitute (amendment to H.R. 4481) we could save somewhere between $2 and $5 billion per year. In an era of deficit reduction and the need to get the biggest bang for the buck from our defense dollar, I think this substitute is very worthy of support...[73]

But closing bases meant constituent job losses, and those, they felt, would translate into negative votes. Congress' failure to obey the laws it passed to

---

[71] Ibid., page 687.

[72] World Almanac page 128.

[73] United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record Vol. 134 No. 101 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 12 July 1988), page H5438.

reduce the deficit contributed to the public perception that it was unable to make tough decisions. The politics of "pork" which prevented the Defense Department from closing military bases was an easy source for denigration of Congress. Since Congress would not allow the closure of any individual base, it had to find a way to take politics out of the process while allowing closures to occur.

The commission offered members a way out. As Representative Armey explained to the HASC, "I understand the need by the Members and I think the commission is a way to protect them, maintain their ability to be involved, protect them from political reprisals...."[74] Representative Jack Brooks, (D-TX) called it "look ma, no hands" legislation.[75] It obviously made sense to eliminate anonymous excess bases, and the establishment of a non-partisan commission had the dual benefits of taking politics out of the issue and shifting the blame for the closures. Brooks called the idea of a commission "Rube Goldberg gimmicks"[76] that "put the base closure decisionmaking process on autopilot,

---

[74] United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on Armed Services, Base Closure, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), page 13.

[75] United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record Vol. 134 No. 101 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 12 July 1988), page H5434.

[76] Rube Goldberg (1883-1970) was an American cartoonist who is best known

getting Congress off the hook by permitting it to avoid its constitutional duty."[77] Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ) summed it up for those concerned with the impact of base closures on reelection, "Through this all-or-nothing approach, Members can be assured that no political retribution could be meted out to an individual Member.[78] Among those without bases, it made perfect sense to vote for the measure, and they did.

The development of the Defense Savings Act and the commission established in the FY Defense Authorization Act illustrate how Congressional members' fears were calmed and political costs to them were lessened. As first introduced, the commission would have had 12 members chosen by the Secretary of Defense and Congressional leaders. This commission would have had six months to select a list of bases for closure, after which the Defense Secretary could accept any or all of the selections. All environmental regulations and any other laws that would restrict closures could have been waived. Congressional opponents

---

for his "Crazy Inventions," in which elaborate hilarious mechanisms are concocted to perform simple operations. The term a "Rube Goldberg," meaning an incredibly complicated, impractical scheme or device, has become part of the American idiom.

[77] United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record Vol. 134 No. 101 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 7 July 1988), page H5324.

[78] Ibid., page H5325.

to this feared that their lack of control gave the administration too much power, one reason for the bill's defeat in 1987. Congress also did not want to make opposition to base closures too easy, so it defeated a 1988 proposal to require Congressional approval of the list. The solution midway between the extremes was to force the Secretary of Defense to accept or reject the entire list without change and Congress could only reject the list by majority vote. Congress further refined the process in 1990. The Defense Secretary would select the commission members, but they would be subject to Senate confirmation. Lastly, any resolution by Congress to reject the list would be subject to presidential veto. The effect was to achieve the objective of taking the politics out of the process, the stated intent of base closure opponents, while allowing cost-saving closings to occur.

Congressional members gained several advantages from this. Because no specific bases were discussed in the acts creating the commission, members of Congress could feel free to support them. Since the national debt was making headlines, getting rid of surplus in the military would be a popular idea in the home districts. Besides, once a base had made the list, there would be little a Congress member could do to change the base's destiny. However, there were several highly visible measures a member could take to placate his constituents. First, he could appeal to the commission not to select for closure the base(s) from

his district. This would be largely ineffective, but it would make the member of Congress appear as if he is "doing something." Second, he could lobby fellow members to reject the closure list (more of the same image-enhancing powerlessness). Finally, he could try to restrict funding for the base closure, which was, like lobbying, denounced by Congressional leadership as blatantly parochial, therefore unsuccessful, but played well at home.

After 1977, litigation was another often used method of blocking closures. Closures usually became bogged down in legal challenges to environmental impact studies, since closure opponents were often able to convince a court that some environmental factors required additional study. Congress overcame this by setting a 60-day limit for filing lawsuits and by eliminating NEPA requirements from the closure selection process. There were no environmental impact studies to challenge because they were not required before a base could be selected for closure.

Lastly, Congress was able to forgo the pain of closure. Although a base may have been selected for closure, the actual closing was not going to take place for several years. In the interim, planning for closure (allowing for another image-enhancing opportunity) would soften the blow of the closure itself. In the years between selection and closure, the public's mental joining of the Congress member and blame would lessen, especially as a Congressman who pushed to

save the base redirected the public's energies toward preparation of the base for turnover and redevelopment of the surrounding community. Of course, condemnation for the closure could be aimed at the non-elected Defense Department.

The history of efforts by Congress with regard to military base closures has been one of efforts to assume control and to safeguard parochial interests. Until the late 1980's, Congress constructed many barriers to base closure. The majority of members of Congress are influenced by their perceptions of constituent opinion and its effects on their reelectability. As public opinion became more vocal on spending control and the effectiveness of Congress in general, the Defense Savings Act became acceptable. Members without bases in their districts determined that the act was suitable for the perceived political end. Those with bases could support the idea of closing anonymous surfeit bases. The inability of the President or the Defense Department to alter the results would limit the powers over military bases they had in the previous policy. Since the same end would result while allowing bases to be closed, the act passed. Finally, those members who lost bases in their districts were allowed opportunities to make loud, if futile, noises to save their bases. Congress had enacted blame-proof policymaking.

IV. METHODOLOGY AND CODING

The objective of our statistical analysis was to measure the correlation between a base closure and the reelectability of a member of Congress. Essentially, we sought to determine whether constituents punish elected Representatives or Senators as a result of a base closure in their particular district or State, respectively.

We chose, as our case study population, four separate groups: (Groups 1 and 2) The members of the House of Representatives from the 101st and 102nd Congresses, respectively, (Group 3) Senators from the 101st Congress whose current terms ended in 1991, and (Group 4) Senators from the 102nd Congress whose current terms ended in 1993. Our dependent variables are the results of the election following each of the base closure rounds, i.e., the 1990 election following the 1989 round and the 1992 election following the 1991 round, and the margin of victory (or loss, if applicable) for those same elections.

Our dependent variable is, of course, whether or not a Congressman was reelected. We developed a second dependent variable, margin of victory (or loss) because the win-lose variable is nominal, therefore not open to regression analysis. Our overall analytical effort was focused on determining which

independent variables caused the greatest effect on winning an election and winning by how much.

Our principal independent variable is base closure. Simply put, we wanted to measure the effect of base closure on a Congressman's reelectability.

We included several money-related independent variables to see if money counted more than base closing in affecting a Congressman's reelectability. Additionally, we wanted to test the accepted notion that money buys votes and more money buys more votes. To enable us to more thoroughly cover all the contingencies, we broke the money variables down into how much each candidate spent, how much he spent for each vote he received, and how much more (or less) he spent than his opponent. A candidate's cost figures could provide other possible reasons for why a member was or was not reelected.

One possibility for an incumbents defeat in the 1992 House election was inclusion on the list of House Members who wrote bad checks. We included the variable in the event we could not determine a strong correlation for another independent variable. We expanded the analysis possibilities by adding another similar independent variable, the number of bad checks each Member on the list wrote. Because of the narrow scope of these variables (1992 House only) and the strong evidence achieved using the other variables across all elections, we did not include these two variables in our final analysis.

We also included as independent variables how long a Member had been in office and all of the results (money, margin, etc.) from the most recent election prior to the announcement of base closure. Our aim here was to see if there was a significant difference from election to election and, if so, could it be attributed to base closures.

The following recapitulation is a summary of all of the variables we included in our final analysis. Included in each summation is our rationale for selecting each variable, the classification and coding of each variable, sources we used to obtain data, and our research notes delineating any particulars or recoding requirements, if any.

1. **Name of Representative**, the case study group. The first 435 names are those of Representatives who were elected in 1988. Names 436 to 870 are those of Representatives who were elected in 1990. Names 871 to 904 are those of Senators whose terms ended in 1991. Names 905 to 939 are those of Senators whose terms ended in 1993. Informative, String. Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics, (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).

Research Note: If a member died while in office or for some other reason failed to complete his full term, his name remained in the respective group according to the parameters outlined above.

2. **Party**, a descriptor of each member. Nominal, Category (Democrat, Republican, or Independent). The Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).

3. **State**, a descriptor of member. Nominal, Category (AK, AL, AR, etc.). The Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).

Research Note: We entered each State's postal abbreviation separately as a category to be able to organize and recall the data for any analysis contingency.

4. **Sex**, a descriptor of member. Nominal, Category (male or female), The Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).

5. **Year First Elected**, a descriptor of member; denotes seniority and possible influence of member. Continuous, Integer. The Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).

Research Note: Year in this case means the year member was elected to his current continuous term.

6. **District**, a descriptor of member. Continuous, Integer, The Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).

Research Note: The members of the House of Representatives from the 101st Congress (Numbers 1-435) reflect the redistricting following the 1980 Census. Members of the House from the 102nd Congress (Numbers 436-870) reflect the redistricting following the 1990 Census.

7. **Final Closure**, a descriptor of which members and districts were effected by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Yes - On base closure list; or No - not on

base closure list), Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Report to the President, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), The Congressional Districts in the 1980s, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1983), FAXes from United States Congress, House of Representatives, Armed Services Committee, 2120 Rayburn Building, Washington, DC.

Research Note: In the 1989 list, we determined a "major" base to be one with more than 1000 employees as described in The Congressional Districts in the 1980s. In the 1991 list, ten RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet Support Activities were on the list without location, thus we presumed them to be less than major, so did not include them in the data. We determined a "major" base to be one with more than 1000 employees as described in The Congressional Districts in the 1980s. No population figures were given for Eaker AFB, Arkansas, nor was it mentioned in The Congressional Districts in the 1980s, so we did not consider it to be a major base. Representative Foglietta (D-PA) had two bases selected for closure in his district, however he could only be credited with one "Yes."

8. **Chamber**, a descriptor of member. Nominal, Category (House of Representatives, Senate), The Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).

9. **Year Groups**, a descriptor of member. Nominal, Category (House - 88-90, Senate - 86-92, etc.), See Variable #1, The Almanac of American Politics, (1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993).

10. **Election Results of 1984 (Election 84)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be

caused by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Won, Lost, N/A), The Almanac of American Politics 1986, (1985).

Research Note: A few members did not participate in regular elections, but special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes for leaving office.

11. **Margin of Victory in 1984 (% Margin 84)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by base closure. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1986, (1985).

Research Note: We used the percentages given for the popular vote of the top two candidates, subtracted the loser from the winner to obtain a raw result, then rounded to the nearest whole percent (no decimal places). If there was no opponent, the victor received a score of 100.

12. **Election Results of 1986 (Election 86)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1992 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Won, Lost, N/A), The Almanac of American Politics 1988, (1987).

Research Note: See **Election Results of 1984.**

13. **Margin of Victory in 1986 (% Margin 86)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1992 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by base closure. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1988, (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1987).

Research Note: See **Margin of Victory 1984.**

14. **Election Results of 1988 (Election 88)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Won only), The Almanac of American Politics 1990, (1989).

Research Note: Some members from this group (Numbers 1-435) did not participate in the 1990 regular elections, but were replaced on that list through special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes for leaving office.

15. **Margin of Victory in 1988 (% Margin 88)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by base closure. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1990, (1989).

Research Note: We used the percentages given for the popular vote of the top two candidates, subtracted the loser from the winner to obtain a raw result, then rounded to the nearest whole percent (no decimal places). If the candidate won in the primary election, we obtained the margin of victory from that. If there was no opponent, the victor received a margin of victory of 100.

16. **Election Results of 1990 (Election 90)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1984 Senate elections, the 1988 House elections for Numbers 1-435, and the 1992 House elections for Numbers 436-870. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Won, Lost, N/A), The Almanac of American Politics 1992, (1991).

Research Note: Some House members from this group (Numbers 1-435) did not participate in the 1988 regular elections, but came to be on this list through special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes for the member on the 1988 list leaving office. Some House members from this group (Numbers 436-870) did not participate in the 1992 regular elections, but were replaced on that list through special elections because of deaths,

resignations, or other non-elective causes for leaving office. Some Senate members from this group (Numbers 870-904) did not participate in the 1984 regular elections, but came to be on this list through special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes for the member on the 1984 list leaving office.

17. **Margin of Victory or Loss in 1990 (% Margin 90)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1984 Senate elections, the 1988 House elections for Numbers 1-435, and the 1992 House elections for Numbers 436-870. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by base closure. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, (1991).

Research Note: We used the percentages given for the popular vote of the top two candidates, subtracted the loser from the winner to obtain a raw result, then rounded to the nearest whole percent (no decimal places). If the candidate won or lost in the primary election, we obtained the margin of victory from that. If there was no opponent, the victor received a margin of victory of 100.

18. **Election Results of 1992 (Election 92)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1986 Senate elections, and the 1990 House elections for Numbers 436-870. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by a base closure. Nominal, Category (Won, Lost, N/A), The Almanac of American Politics 1994, (1993).

Research Note: Some House members from this group did not participate in the 1990 regular elections, but came to be on this list through special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes for the member on the 1990 list leaving office. Some Senate members from this group did not participate in the 1986 regular elections, but came to be on this list through special elections because of deaths, resignations, or other non-elective causes for the member on the 1986 list leaving office.

19. **Margin of Victory or Loss in 1992 (% Margin 92)**, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1986 Senate elections and the 1990 House elections for Numbers 436-870. Rationale = fluctuations could be caused by base closure. Continuous, Real (Won, Lost, N/A), The Almanac of American Politics 1994, (1993).

Research Note: We used the percentages given for the popular vote of the top two candidates, subtracted the loser from the winner to obtain a raw result, then rounded to the nearest whole percent (no decimal places). If the candidate won or lost in the primary election, we obtained the margin of victory from that. If there was no opponent, the victor received a margin of victory of 100.

20. **Expenditures 1984**, to denote all outgoing funds spent by the Senate candidate committees from 1 January 1983 and ending 31 December 1984 (1983-1984 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1986, (1985).

Research Note: All funds include loan repayments and contributions by the committee to other candidates or committees. Refunds of contributions have been subtracted from the total. Totals are rounded to the nearest thousand dollars. In the event an individual is on our list due to non-elective causes, we left his column blank.

21. **Cost-per-Vote 1984 (Cost/Vote 84)**, to denote how much each Senate candidate spent per vote he received in the 1984 election. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 Senate elections.

Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.

Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1986, (1985).

Research Note: Cost per vote is calculated by dividing total expenditures by the number of votes received by the named candidate. Totals are rounded to the nearest penny. In the event an individual is on our list due to non-elective causes, we left his column blank.

22. **Spending Edge 1984**, to denote the difference between the campaign expenditures of the named candidate and his principle opponent. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 Senate elections.

Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.

Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1986, (1985).

Research Note: Where the named candidate was outspent by his opponent, we assigned the Spending Edge as a negative number. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) does not require candidates raising or spending less than $5,000 to file, although some do anyway. If an opponent spent less than $5,000 and chose not to file, the FEC considers him as having spent nothing. In these cases, the winning candidates spending edge will equal his expenditures figure. Totals are rounded to the nearest thousand dollars. In the event an individual is on our list due to non-elective causes, we left his column blank.

23. **Expenditures 1986**, to denote all outgoing funds spent by the Senate candidate committees from 1 January 1985 and ending 31 December 1986 (1985-1986 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1992 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1988, (1987).

Research Note: See **Expenditures 1984**.

24. **Cost-per-Vote 1986 (Cost/Vote 86)**, to denote how much each Senate candidate spent per vote he received in the 1986 election. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1992 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1988, (1987).

Research Note: See **Cost-per-Vote 1984**.

25. **Spending Edge 1986**, to denote the difference between the campaign expenditures of the named candidate and his principle opponent. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1992 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1988, (1987).

Research Note: See **Spending Edge 1984**.

26. **Expenditures 1988**, to denote all outgoing funds spent by the House candidate committees from 1 January 1987 and ending 31 December 1988 (1987-1988 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1990, (1989).

Research Note: All funds include loan repayments and contributions by the committee to other candidates or committees. Refunds of contributions have

been subtracted from the total. If a candidate won in the primary election and did not have to run in the general election, his figure is taken from the primary election. Totals are rounded to the nearest thousand dollars. In the event an individual is on our list due to non-elective causes, we left his column blank.

27. **Cost-per-Vote 1988 (Cost/Vote 88)**, to denote how much each House candidate spent per vote he received in the 1988 election. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections.

Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.

Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1990, (1989).

Research Note: Cost per vote is calculated by dividing total expenditures by the number of votes received by the named candidate. If a candidate won in the primary election and did not have to run in the general election, his cost-per vote is figured from the primary election. Totals are rounded to the nearest penny. In the event an individual is on our list due to non-elective causes, we left his column blank.

28. **Spending Edge 1988**, to denote the difference between the campaign expenditures of the named candidate and his principal opponent. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections.

Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss.

Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1990, (1989).

Research Note: Where the named candidate was outspent by his opponent, we assigned the Spending Edge as a negative number. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) does not require candidates raising or spending less than $5,000 to file, although some do anyway. If an opponent spent less than $5,000 and chose not to file, the FEC considers him as having spent nothing. In these cases, the winning candidates spending edge will equal his expenditures figure. If a candidate won in the primary election and did not have to run in the general election, his spending edge is taken from the primary election.

Totals are rounded to the nearest thousand dollars. In the event an individual is on our list due to non-elective causes, we left his column blank.

29. **Expenditures 1990**, to denote all outgoing funds spent by the House and Senate candidate committees from 1 January 1989 and ending 31 December 1990 (1989-1990 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1988 House elections for Numbers 1-435, the 1992 House elections for Numbers 436-870, and the 1984 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, (1991).

Research Note: See **Expenditures 1988**.

30. **Cost-per-Vote 1990 (Cost/Vote 90)**, to denote how much each House candidate spent per vote he received in the 1990 election. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to: the 1988 House elections for Numbers 1-435, the 1992 House elections for Numbers 436-870, and the 1984 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, (1991).

Research Note: See **Cost-per-Vote 1988**.

31. **Spending Edge 1990**, to denote the difference between the campaign expenditures of the named candidate and his principal opponent. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to: the 1988 House elections for

Numbers 1-435, the 1992 House elections for Numbers 436-870, and the 1984 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, (1991).

Research Note: See **Spending Edge 1988.**

32. **Expenditures 1992,** to denote all outgoing funds spent by the House and Senate candidate committees from 1 January 1991 and ending 31 December 1992 (1991-1992 election cycle). Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections and the 1986 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1994, (1993).

Research Note: See **Expenditures 1988.**

33. **Cost-per-Vote 1992 (Cost/Vote 92),** to denote how much each House candidate spent per vote he received in the 1992 election. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections and the 1986 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1994, (1993).

Research Note: See **Cost-per-Vote 1988.**

34. **Spending Edge 1992,** to denote the difference between the campaign expenditures of the named candidate and his principal opponent. Additionally, to denote an increase or decrease in comparison to the 1990 House elections and the 1986 Senate elections. Rationale = fluctuations could be a determinant of electoral victory or loss. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1994, (1993).

Research Note: See **Spending Edge 1988.**

35. **Closure,** a descriptor of which members and districts were effected by a base closure. Continuous, Real (1 - on base closure list; or 0 - not on base closure list), Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, Report to the President, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), The Congressional Districts in the 1980s, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1983).

Research Note: See Variable #7, **Final Closure.** We recoded this from nominal to continuous to be able to include this variable in regression analysis.

36. **Tenure 90,** a descriptor of member; denotes seniority and possible influence of member. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, (1991).

Research Note: See Variable #5, **Year First Served.** We recoded this from integer (year of election) to real (number of years of continuous service) to be able to better use for analysis as an independent variable.

37. **Tenure 92**, a descriptor of member; denotes seniority and possible influence of member. Continuous, Real, The Almanac of American Politics 1994, (1991).

Research Note: See **Tenure 90**.

38. **Check Scandal**, to denote whether named Representatives in the 102nd Congress had at least one bounced check in the highly publicized scandal. Rationale = Provides another possible reason for why a member was not reelected. Nominal, Category (Yes or No), Congressional Quarterly, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 18 April 1992), pages 1006-1007.

39. **Number of Checks Bounced (# of Checks)**, To denote the number of checks bounced by each House member in the 102nd Congress. Rationale = To determine possible influence of the number of bounced checks on the member's reelection and to annotate the extent of abusive behavior. Continuous, Integer, Congressional Quarterly, (18 April 1992), pages 1006-1007.

During the course of our research, we deleted columns denoting base name, base location (urban or rural), base size (small, medium, or large), base type (USA, USAF, USMC, and USN), and year of base closure. Our rationale was since these columns were not descriptive of the members of Congress, but of the base itself, we could get little useful information germane to our thesis from

them. Additionally, a separate database is required to use variables describing the bases, which is beyond the scope of this study. We also took steps to further refine our database and deleted variables denoting (1) whether the member of Congress was a member of the HASC or SASC, (2) if he had any military experience, (3) if he had written a letter to the Government Accounting Office in an attempt to remove a base from a list, (4) his rating on the National Security Index, and finally, (5) how he voted on the final base closure list. These variables were to be used, in the event our hypothesis was disproved, to determine if such actions had any bearing on a member's reelectability. As we will see in the next chapter, these variables were not needed.

V. EXPLANATION AND INTERPRETATION OF ANALYSES

This chapter explains the results we obtained from the four types of analysis which we used to support our thesis that the reelectability of members of Congress is not hurt by base closures. Of all the independent variables used, base closures tended to have the least effect on an individual's reelectability. The four types of analyses which we used to support are thesis include: Contingency Tables, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), Correlation and Covariance, and Regression. For the sake of clarity, we divided this chapter into four subchapters, one for each of the aforementioned analyses. Additionally, we divided each subchapter into the four election categories examined in this thesis: (1) 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures, (2) 1992 House Election vs 1991 Base Closures, (3) 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures, and (4) 1992 Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures. However, when a finding in one election category has an impact or is directly related to a finding in another election category, then we discuss this occurrence in the subsequent election category.

A. CONTINGENCY TABLES

Contingency tables are used to determine whether or not a relationship exists between two nominal variables. A variable is nominal when it classifies

individual cases into distinct groups. For instance, in our dataset, entries such as REP, DEM, IND, are nominal variables referring to which party a Congressman belongs. Some included WON, LOST, and N/A to refer to what happened in a given election year, while others were simply YES or NO to identify whether or not an individual had a base close within his State or district. The contingency tables analysis gives us four separate tables: a summary table, an observed frequencies table, a percent of column totals table, and an expected values table. A summary table shows the actual results or number of cases for each cell, as opposed to an expected values table, which shows what the results were expected to be if an independent variable did not have any relationship to a dependent variable. The following is an explanation and interpretation of our analyses.

1. 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures

The first test we ran was to determine the relationship between the dependent variable, ELECTION 90, and the independent variable, CLOSURE LIST (See TABLE 1). In comparing the observed frequencies with the expected values, we quickly note that they are almost exactly the same. Statistically, between ten and 11 people who had a base selected for closure were expected to win the election; ten, in fact, won. On the other hand, either nobody or one person who had a base selected for closure was expected to lose. As expected,

one Member, Representative Stanford E. Parris (R-VA), did lose.[79] By taking a look at the percents of column totals, it appears as if having a base selected for closure within one's district doubled one's chance of losing the election. 3.546% of those who did not have a base selected for closure lost while 8.333% of those who did have a base selected for closure lost. However, this apparent doubling is the result of a single election and would be reversed had Parris not lost. Lastly, two figures in the summary table, which further reinforce that base closure really did not make a difference in this election, are the low contingency coefficient and relatively high Chi Square P-Value (.042 and .6856). A contingency coefficient has a range from 0 to 1 and is used to compare the relationship between different pairs of variables. In this instance, the relationship is weak. The Chi-Square P-Value indicates the probability of a relationship being due to chance. The lower the value; the less likely that a relationship is due to chance. Any value above .2000 suggests that the

---

Base closings seemed to be of little consequence in one of 1990's nastier House races. The contest had an inauspicious start and degenerated as the campaign progressed. Parris seemed to have the driver's seat but became bogged down by a relative lack of attention to constituency service and metropolitan Washington, DC issues. He also often took cheap shots at his Democratic opponent, Alexandria Mayor Jim Moran, who had a few skeletons in his own political closet. Both had little good to say about each other. Each spent close to a million dollars on the campaign which had abortion as its major substantive issue. After a 52%-45% victory, Moran thanked Parris for defeating himself. Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992, (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1991), pages 1284-86.

association between the variables is likely due to chance. In this contingency table, the relationship is most likely due to chance. In the end, the 1990 House election clearly shows that having a base selected for closure did not negatively impact a Congressman's reelectability.

2. 1992 House Election vs 1991 Base Closures

We ran the same analysis for this next category; however, we substituted the dependent variable, ELECTION 92, for the one previously used to reflect the new election year. The independent variable, CLOSURE LIST, remained the same (See TABLE 2). While the expected values do not match as closely to the observed frequencies as in the previous section, the numbers are not too far off. 16 people who had a base close were expected to win the election; 14 people actually won. In terms of losing, between two and three people were expected to lose; however, four lost. The percent of column totals state that 9.685% of those who did not have a base selected for closure lost, compared with the 18.182% of those who did have a base selected for closure lost. Again, it appears as if the chance of losing doubled if a base were selected for closure within one's district, but again, it amounts to a difference of one election. At most, one more person lost than was expected, but was it due to having a base selected for closure within his district? In any case, the relationship is weak and probably due to chance (contingency coefficient , .067; Chi Square P-Value, .3729).

Therefore, the effect would be so weak that it would not fundamentally alter reelection rates. Because of this, there is no relationship between the dependent variable, ELECTION 92, and the independent variable, CLOSURE LIST.

3. 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures

We completed a similar type analysis for the two Senate elections. In the first year group, the dependent variable, ELECTION 90, was crossed with the independent variable, CLOSURE LIST (See TABLE 3). As in the other two cases, the observed frequencies portion is almost a carbon copy of what was expected. Four Senators having a base selected for closure in their State were expected to win the election. Not surprisingly, four of them did win. Additionally between zero and one Senator who had a base selected for closure in his State was expected to lose. None lost. As a result, the percentages show that 3.448% of those Senators not having a base selected for closure lost while those who had a base selected for closure never lost. It is important to keep in mind that we are looking at a much smaller sample, 34 individuals, in the Senate as compared to 435 people from the House. Of the 34 Senators used in this analysis, 31 sought reelection in 1990. After the election, one Senator lost. It just so happened that he did not have a base from his State selected for closure. Furthermore, the relationship is weak (contingency coefficient, .173) and it is based on chance (Chi Square P-Value, .5923). As with the others, the independent variable, BASE

CLOSURE, did not empirically have an effect on the dependent variable, ELECTION 90.

4. 1992 Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures

The last contingency table that we used to support our thesis pertained to the dependent variable, ELECTION 92, and the independent variable, CLOSURE LIST (See TABLE 4). As we saw in the three previous sections, the expected values and the observed frequencies are very similar. We expected to see seven people who had a base selected for closure win. Also, we expected one to two people who had a base selected for closure to lose. After the election, seven people having a base selected for closure won, while one person who had a base selected for closure lost. Interestingly, the percents of column totals for this election suggest the exact opposite of what occurred in the House election. In this instance, not having a base selected for closure in one's State appears to double one's chances of losing the election. 16.667% of those who did not have a base selected for closure lost; only 9.091% of those who did have a base selected for closure lost. As before, this difference comes out to being just one individual election. Furthermore, what is the actual effect of base closure on whether or not one wins or loses? The relationship between the two variables is weak and likely due to chance (contingency coefficient, .191; Chi Square P-Value, .5168). In

conclusion, as with both House elections and the previous Senate election, the above results demonstrate that base closure had no effect on one's reelectability.

While the previous four sections support our thesis, we elected to include another contingency table because it pertains to the entire base closure proceedings. Before the first two rounds of the base closure process were complete, many Democrats accused the Republican Administration of unfairly selecting bases which were located primarily in areas where Democrats were in office. In fact, Representative Schroeder (D-CO) openly accused Secretary of Defense Cheney of using a bipartisan commission, BRACC, to accept partisan base closure recommendations. However, the opposite is what actually occurred (See TABLES 5-8). In all four categories, the dependent variable, CLOSURE LIST, was compared with the independent variable, PARTY. In the 1990 House election, between four and five Republican Congressmen were expected to have a base selected for closure; seven or eight Democrats were to experience the same. However, seven Republicans had a base selected for closure, compared to only five for the Democrats. The percent of column totals (4.0 for Republicans, 1.923 for Democrats) suggest that being Republican more than doubled one's chance of having a base from one's district selected for closure. While the relationship is weak (contingency coefficient, .062), the Chi Square P-Value is fairly low (.1947). Therefore, the two variables did have a weak relationship

which may not necessarily have been due to chance. In the 1992 House election, the expected values and the observed frequencies are more alike. Eight Republicans were expected to have a base selected for closure; eight did. 13 to 14 Democrats were expected to have a base selected for closure; 14 did. The percents evened out as well. 4.819% of the Republicans had a base selected for closure; 5.224% of the Democrats did. However, the relationship is very weak and absolutely due to chance (contingency coefficient, .014, Chi Square P-Value, .9568). With respect to the 1990 Senate election, both the Republicans and the Democrats were expected to have between two and three people each to have a base selected for closure within each one's respective State. In reality, three Republicans ended up having a base selected for closure, whereas, only two Democrats experienced the same. As a result, the percents of column totals is slightly higher for the Republicans than it is for the Democrats, 17.647% to 11.765%. Again, the low contingency coefficient (.083) and the high Chi Square P-Value (.6282) make the relationship weak and most likely due to chance. Lastly, in the 1992 Senate election, four or five Republicans were expected to have a base selected for closure; five did. Six or seven Democrats were expected to have the same; six did. Again, the Republicans have a slightly higher percent total, 33.333%, as compared to the Democrats percent total, 30.000%. However, the relationship is weak (contingency coefficient, .036) and it is due to chance

(Chi Square P-Value, .8335). Regardless of what caused it, it is clear that the Democrats were not treated unfairly. Overall, the Democrats did have a higher number of individuals experiencing a base closure; 27 of them had a base selected for closure compared to only 23 for the Republicans. However, the expected values tell quite a different story. Statistically, the Republicans were expected to have no more than 21 people experience a base closure; the Democrats were expected to have as many as 30 people in their party have a base selected for closure. Without a doubt, Representative Schroeder and some of her colleagues are incorrect in their assumption that Secretary Cheney was partial in selecting bases for closure and in their belief that the Democrats were treated inequitably.

B. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA)

ANOVA examines the relationship between two variables to see if different groups have a different means score. While a contingency tables analyzes two nominal variables, ANOVA observes the relationship between a nominal independent variable and a continuous dependent variable. Continuous variables are those variables which can be expressed numerically. In our dataset, some continuous variables include the year first served and tenure of a Congressman. Other examples include the percent margin of victory for members of Congress during a given election year, while still others refer to the

dollar values of total expenditures, cost per vote, and spending edge used by Congressmen in their quest for reelection. As before, we will present our results for this type of analysis separately for each election category.

1. 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures

The first ANOVA analysis we conducted was to determine what effect our independent variable, BASE CLOSURE, had on our dependent variable, % MARGIN 90 (See TABLE 9). The mean margin of victory for those Representatives who had a base selected for closure was 37.273%; for those not having a base selected for closure, it was slightly higher at 41.106%. However, it is again necessary to examine the P-Value to determine the probability that these differences are due to chance. In this instance, the differences in percent margin were due to chance (P-Value, .6936). When using ANOVA tables, one starts with the assumption that the independent variable will have no effect. With this assumption and a high probability that the differences are due to chance, it is a reasonable argument to state that being on the closure list did not affect the margin of victory for any member of Congress in this election. Additionally, when we ran the same analysis and split it by those who won and those who lost the 1990 election, the results changed slightly (See TABLE 10). Those who won the election and had a base selected for closure won by an average margin of victory of 41.7%. Those who won the election and did not have a base selected

for closure won by an average margin of victory of 43.062%. The difference between these results and the previous ANOVA table shows that the variation went from roughly 4% to about 2%. On the other hand, those representatives who were defeated lost by -7% or -7.267%, regardless of whether or not they had a base from their district selected for closure. If an individual lost, the fact he had a base selected for closure did not appear to effect his margin one way or another. However, these differences are still due to chance (P-Values, .8904 and .9749). The next set of analyses that we performed pertained to our dependent variable, ELECTION 90. We wanted to see what effect the 1990 House election had on an individual's total expenditures, his cost per vote, and his spending edge over his competition (See TABLE 11). All three variables had a direct effect on the outcome of the 1990 election and this effect was not at all due to chance (P-Values, less than .0001, less than .0001, and .0916, respectively). Those who won the election spent an average of $392,000 in total expenditures, spent $4.38 per vote, and outspent their competition by an average of $319,000. Conversely, those who lost actually had a higher total expenditure of $655,333. Their cost per vote averaged $8.44, but they were only able to outspend their competition by $220,867. In essence, they had to spend more because their competition was spending more. As a result, their expenditures and cost per vote were higher, while their spending edge was not as high as those individuals who won.

Therefore, what one spends on an election has a direct effect on how well one will do in the same election. Similarly, we analyzed what effect tenure and the outcome of the election had on one another (See TABLE 12). Those who won had an average tenure of 11 years in office, while those who lost served just nine years. However, this effect is quite possibly due to chance (P-Value, .3311).

2. 1992 House Election vs 1991 Base Closures

Using the same independent variable, BASE CLOSURE, we crossed it with our dependent variable, % MARGIN 92 (See TABLE 13). The average margin of victory for those Representatives having a base from their district selected for closure was 26.5%. On the other hand, those who did not have a base selected for closure enjoyed a slightly higher average margin of victory of 28.403%. However, these differences are likely due to chance (P-Value, .7554). In turn, it supports the hypothesis that we assume it has no effect. Interestingly, after the first round of base closures, there was a 4% difference in the average margin of victory between those having bases selected for closure and those not having bases selected for closure. After the second round, this difference was cut in half to 2%. Therefore, if there was anything to the effect that base closure had on election margins of victory, then it seemed to have lessened dramatically after the more recent and more noticeable round of base closures. When we used the same variables and split the results by those who won and those who lost the

1992 election, we discovered something startling. The mean margin of victory for those who had a base selected for closure and who won the election was 36.929% (See TABLE 14). The same figure for those who did not have a base selected for closure and who won the election was somewhat less at 33.381%. Of those who won, base closure appears to have had a positive effect. Yet, there is a strong likelihood that this difference is due to chance (P-Value, .5560). While those who lost were defeated by roughly the same amount, -10.0% or -10.175%. These differences; however, are entirely due to chance (P-Value, .9694).

Comparing the same elections costs to our dependent variable, ELECTION 92 (See TABLE 15), we find that the effect which EXPENDITURES 92 and COST/VOTE 92 has on our dependent variable is not due to chance (P-Values, less than .0001). However, the same is not true for the effect which SPENDING EDGE 92 has on our dependent variable (P-Value, .4376). The average total expenditures for the winners was $563,380; for the losers, it was $886,391. The winners' cost per vote averaged $4.20, while the losers' cost per vote averaged $8.07. Lastly, the winners had an average spending edge of $424,901, but the losers only averaged $368,870. As the previous House election showed, the losers had to spend more because their competition was spending more. Because they lost and had fewer votes, their costs per vote were higher. This is consistent with what one would expect to find in a highly contested race;

however, it is difficult to determine which factor drove the other. Were the dollar figures found to be high after the election results were in, or was it the fact that it had been previously determined to be a tight race which drove the expenditures up? Regardless, there is a direct effect between what one spends on an election and the election's outcome. Because the independent variable, TENURE 92, did not vary greatly whether or not one won or lost (See TABLE 16), it matters little that its effect is not due to chance (P-Value, less than .001). Nevertheless, the winners averaged a little over 11 years; the losers averaged a little over 12. Thus, tenure was not a significant factor in this election.

3. 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures

As with the House elections, the first ANOVA test we ran in the Senate was to determine what effect our independent variable, BASE CLOSURE, had on our dependent variable, % MARGIN 90. The average margin of victory for those Senators with a base from their State selected for closure was 28.0% (See TABLE 17). For those not having one selected it was 35.556%, a difference of seven percent. However, this is likely due to chance (P-Value, .6532). When we ran the same variables and split them by winners and losers (using the variable, ELECTION 90), we found that the results were essentially the same (See TABLE 18). In this case, however, the effect is less likely due to chance than before, but still likely due to chance (P-Value, .5904). On the other hand, the ANOVA and

means tables for those who lost the election, whether or not they had a base selected for closure, was not completed because there were too few observations to compute. It is important to remember that only one Senator lost in his bid for reelection in 1990, and he did not have a base from his State get selected for closure.

With respect to the dollar values spent during the election and their effect on the election as a whole, we ran the same ANOVA analysis for the Senate as for the House. Unlike the House where we found extremely low P-Values nullifying the probability of chance, the opposite it true for the 1990 Senate election (See TABLE 19). On the whole, whatever effect the amounts for the variables, EXPENDITURES 90, COST/VOTE 90, and SPENDING EDGE 90, have on the likelihood of being reelected, it is surely due to chance (P-Values, .6109, .9254, .4452, respectively). The Senators who won spent an average of $4,072,633 on their elections while those who lost spent substantially more - $6,221,000. The costs per vote were very similar. The victors averaged $7.71; the losers averaged $7.20. With respect to spending edge, the winners surprisingly had less of an average spending edge than did the losers by a difference of $2,508,333 to $4,880,000. As previously mentioned, these amounts suggest highly contested races in which it is difficult to ascertain exactly which had a bigger impact on the other. In either case, at least for this Senate election, any effect is highly due to

chance. In terms of tenure, the 1990 Senate election is much like the 1992 House election in that it is based on chance (See TABLE 20, P-Value, .9720). The average tenure for those who won was just over 13 years; for those who lost it was 12 years. Therefore, tenure did not have a strong effect on the likelihood of someone being reelected.

4. 1992 Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures

The final series of ANOVA tests which we ran pertained to the same independent variables and their effect on both dependent variables, % MARGIN 92 and ELECTION 92. Those Senators who had a base from their State selected for closure averaged a 16.125% margin of victory (See TABLE 21). Those who did not experience a base selected for closure from their respective States enjoyed a scarcely higher 17.190% margin of victory. As with the three previous analyses between base closure and margin of victory, this one is also very likely due to chance (P-Value, .8816). Unlike the former Senate election, which produced similar results after splitting by another nominal variable, this time different results were obtained (See TABLE 22). First, Senators who had a base selected for closure and who won the election had an average margin of victory of 20.714% compared to an average margin of victory of 22.176% for those Senators who did not have a base selected for closure and who won the election. However, this is due to chance (P-Value, .8208). On the other hand, those who

lost and who had a base in their State selected for closure lost by -16.0%. This figure is compared to -4.0% for those Senators who lost and who did not have a base close. This finding is not due to chance (P-Value, .0157). However, a closer look at the table shows that a single individual is accounting for the -16%. Because only one Senator is involved here, other factors may have come into play causing him to not only lose, but to lose by such a margin.

Moving to the dollars values and their impact on the election, we find that the probability of chance varies greatly between the three independent variables (See TABLE 23). Of the three, only the effect that Spending Edge 92 has on ELECTION 92 is not due to chance (P-Value, .0142). The other two are due to chance (P-Values, .5447 and .3583). Those who won in this election spent an average of $4,097,542, while those who lost put out nearly 20% more at $4,914,500. Ironically, in the House the cost per vote differential between those who won and those who lost was about double: the losers spent twice per vote what the winners spent. However, in the first Senate category both the winners and losers spent in the $7.00 range. In this second Senate category the winners almost doubled the losers in what was spent per vote. The winners averaged $7.05/vote; the losers, only $4.12/vote. Completely contrary to what we saw in the 1990 Senate election, where the spending edge of the losers was greater than the spending edge of the winners, the opposite is true in this Senate election.

The winners outspent their opponents by an average of $2,798,292. The losers were not so fortunate; they only outspent their competition by an average of $850,500, which for a Senate seat, does not amount to much. This difference, with no likelihood of it being due to chance, clearly shows that spending edge directly effected the outcome of the election. Lastly, we examined the effect tenure had on the election (See TABLE 24). The average numbers of years in office for the winners was almost 13 years. The losers averaged only seven years, a difference of about six years. While it appears as if tenure did have an effect, it is likely due to chance (P-Value, .3201). Nonetheless, it suggests that there may be some credence to the relationship between the two variables, TENURE 92 and ELECTION 92, and their effect on one another. However, a regression analysis will determine more later.

C. CORRELATION AND COVARIANCE

The last analysis and perhaps the most significant that we conducted with our dataset, dealt with regression. However, before accomplishing this task, we needed to conduct a correlation test. The correlation values tell us the degree of linear relationship between two or more variables. While variables such as % MARGIN 90 and TENURE 90 do not have a linear relationship, others such as EXPENDITURES 90, COST/VOTE 90, and SPENDING EDGE 90 do. Therefore, we tested for multi-colinearity to make sure that multiple variables were not too

strongly related. A correlation test assesses the extent of this relationship. If the relationship is not too strong, then the variables can be used together in a regression. However, if the relationship between two or more independent variables is too strong, i.e., is multi-collinear, then the variables should not be used together in a regression. Multi-collinearity makes the results sensitive to sample or measurement error and produces an analysis with unstable coefficient estimates. In turn, the results can not only be difficult to interpret, but they can also be completely useless. After completing the test, it is necessary to examine the correlation coefficient, which has an absolute range from 0 to 1. If the multiple variables assessed have a correlation coefficient of .75 or higher, they should not be used. In the tests we ran on the variables pertaining to money spent on elections, we used only the two variables which had the lowest value, i.e., smallest degree, of linear relationship.

1. 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures

We completed two separate correlation matrices for the six independent variables: EXPENDITURES 88, COST/VOTE 88, SPENDING EDGE 88, EXPENDITURES 90, COST/VOTE 90, and SPENDING EDGE 90 (See TABLE 25). As a result, we discarded both EXPENDITURES 88 and EXPENDITURES 90 since the values for the other two variables were lower. COST/VOTE 88 and

SPENDING EDGE 88 had a correlation coefficient of .489; COST/VOTE 90 and SPENDING EDGE 90 had a value of .683

2. 1992 House Election vs 1991 Base Closures

In the 1992 House election, we conducted the same type of correlation test; however, instead of the dollar amounts spent for the 1988 election year, we used those figures for the 1992 election year (See TABLE 26). Our six independent variables were: EXPENDITURES 90, COST/VOTE 90, SPENDING EDGE 90, EXPENDITURES 92, COST/VOTE 92, and SPENDING EDGE 92. Again, we dropped both expenditures figures. COST/VOTE 90 and SPENDING EDGE 90 had a correlation coefficient of .599 while COST/VOTE 92 and SPENDING EDGE 92 had one of .670.

3. 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures

Moving to the Senate and the next category, we find a slight deviation (See TABLE 27). Whereas we previously discarded the expenditures figure, this was not the case for the 1984 Senate election. In this matrix, COST/VOTE 84 and SPENDING EDGE 84 had a correlation coefficient of .773, past the acceptable limit of .75. Additionally, the correlation coefficient for EXPENDITURES 84 and COST/VOTE 84 was lower at .628. However, this deviation did not hold true for the 1992 Senate election. As in the past, we discarded the variable,

EXPENDITURES 90, because the lowest correlation coefficient, .230, belonged to the COST/VOTE 90 and SPENDING EDGE 90.

4. 1992 Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures

In the last correlation matrix (See TABLE 28), we again encountered the previously mentioned deviation; however, in this instance, we found a negative value. The correlation coefficient for the two variables, EXPENDITURES 86 and COST/VOTE 86, was -.003 while the same figure was .039 for COST/VOTE 86 and SPENDING EDGE 86. As before, we found this deviation occurred only in the earlier Senate election. For the 1992 election, we discarded EXPENDITURES 92 since the lowest value, .140, was for COST/VOTE 92 and SPENDING EDGE 92.

D. REGRESSION

The final type of analysis which we completed had to do with regression. This type of analysis is used to determine the strength of a relationship between one or more independent variables to a dependent variable. In our tests we used multiple regression since we wanted to see which of several independent variables had the greatest effect on our dependent variable. Because only continuous variables could be used in conducting this analysis, we recoded our nominal variable, CLOSURE LIST, to make it a "dummy" variable named CLOSURE. In essence, we assigned a value of one if an individual had a base in

his district or State selected for closure; we assigned a value of zero if he did not. Our independent variables were then analyzed with our dependent variable of percent margin of victory for each given election year.

1. 1990 House Election vs 1989 Base Closures

In this election year, we crossed seven independent variables with the dependent variable, % MARGIN 90 (See TABLE 29). The independent variables were: % MARGIN 88, COST/VOTE 88, SPENDING EDGE 88, COST/VOTE 90, SPENDING EDGE 90, CLOSURE, and TENURE 90. As explained in the Correlation And Covariance section, we discarded EXPENDITURES 88 and EXPENDITURES 90. From this analysis, we learn that the variable which had the greatest effect on what an individual's percent margin of victory was COST/VOTE 90 (standardized coefficient, -.519). Additionally, this effect is absolutely not due to chance (P-Value, less than .0001). The variable which had the next greatest effect on one's margin of victory, is % MARGIN 88 (standardized coefficient, .349). This effect is also not due to chance (P-Value, less than .0001). The independent variable, CLOSURE, did not have an effect on % MARGIN 90 (standardized coefficient, .014; P-Value, .7567). Still, the ANOVA table shows that our regression table is a believable model, as a whole (P-Value, less than .0001). Lastly, less than a third of the variation in % MARGIN 90 is explainable by the independent variables collectively (R Squared, .284). To get a

more complete picture, we then conducted the same regression analysis, but we split it by those who won and those who lost (See Tables 30 and 31). As a result, for the winners, the variable which had the greatest effect on percent margin of victory was still COST/VOTE 90. However, the variable with the least effect became CLOSURE (coefficient, .010). Furthermore, the model as a whole is still believable (P-Value, less than .0001). For the losers, the variables with the greatest effect were COST/VOTE 88 and % MARGIN 88 (coefficients, .971 and .924, respectively); however, their effect is likely due to chance (P-Values, .2952 and .2107). CLOSURE again had little to no effect (coefficient, .136; P-Value, .7766).

2. 1992 House Election vs 1991 Base Closures

We completed a similar test in this election year; however, we changed our dependent variable to % MARGIN 92. The independent variables included: % MARGIN 90, COST/VOTE 90, SPENDING EDGE 90, COST/VOTE 92, SPENDING EDGE 92, CLOSURE, and TENURE 92 (See TABLE 32). As previously mentioned, we discarded the variables, EXPENDITURES 90 and EXPENDITURES 92. The variable having the greatest effect on the dependent variable was COST/VOTE 92 (standardized coefficient, -.807). Additionally, this effect is not due to chance (P-Value, less than .0001). From the two House elections it can be said that what an individual spent on the election, divided by

the numbers of votes he received, was the most significant factor in effecting his margin of victory for both elections. In this election, CLOSURE had the least effect on one's margin of victory (coefficient, -.012). Furthermore, this effect is surely due to chance (P-Value, .7869). Additionally, the ANOVA table proves that this model, as a whole, is believable (P-Value, less than .0001). Additionally, the model fits the 1992 House election a little better than it fit the 1990 House election (R Square, .407). After completing a split by analysis (See TABLES 33 and 34), the variable which had the greatest effect on the winner's percent margin of victory was still COST/VOTE 92 (coefficient, -.719). The effect is absolutely not due to chance (P-Value, less than .0001). Again, CLOSURE had the least effect (coefficient, .036) and the likelihood that this effect is due to chance dropped by almost half (P-Value, .4498). As a whole, the model is believable (P-Value, less than .0001). The same can be said for the losers, however, to different degrees. COST/VOTE 92 had the greatest effect (coefficient, -.812); CLOSURE had the least (coefficient, -.048). In conclusion, whether an individual won or lost, regardless of whether or not he ran in the 1990 or the 1992 House election, the independent variable, CLOSURE, had very little, if any, effect on the overall outcome of the election.

3. 1990 Senate Election vs 1989 Base Closures

Over in the Senate, we conducted similar regression analyses. However, as briefly mentioned in the section, Correlation And Covariance, we substituted the expenditures values for the spending edge values in both earlier Senate elections. In the first category, our dependent variable was % MARGIN 90; our independent variables were: % MARGIN 84, EXPENDITURES 84, COST/VOTE 84, COST/VOTE 90, SPENDING EDGE 90, CLOSURE, and TENURE 90 (See Table 35). Of those variables, COST/VOTE 90 had the greatest effect on percent margin of victory (coefficient, -.585) and it is not likely due to chance (P-Value, .0079). CLOSURE, on the other hand, had no effect (coefficient, -.013; P-Value, .9421). The model has a high degree of believability (P-Value, .0310). Furthermore, almost half of the variation in the percent margin variable is explainable by the independent variables collectively (R Square, .470). Because there were too few people who lost in this group, we were unable to complete this analysis using the split by function.

4. 1992 Senate Election vs 1991 Base Closures

In this last group we changed the dependent variable to % MARGIN 92. Our independent variables included: % MARGIN 86, EXPENDITURES 86, COST/VOTE 86, COST/VOTE 92, SPENDING EDGE 92, CLOSURE, and TENURE 92 (See TABLE 36). This time, however, TENURE 92 had the greatest

effect on % MARGIN 92 (coefficient, -.858) and it is not due to chance (P-Value, .0144). % MARGIN 86 had the second greatest effect which was also not due to chance (coefficient, .819; P-Value, .0182, respectively). Interestingly, the variables with dollar values did not have much of an effect. In fact, COST/VOTE 86 had absolutely no effect (coefficient, -.004, P-Value, .9863). As in the previous Senate election, CLOSURE also had no effect (standardized coefficient, -.017; P-Value, .9386). Overall, from the ANOVA table, we can determine that the model is believable (P-Value, .1468). Again, due to the smaller number of observations in the Senate than in the House, we were unable to perform a split by series to separate the winners from the losers. As in the House, regardless of the election year, the independent variable, CLOSURE, did not have much of an overall effect on the outcome of an individual's reelectability.

E. SUMMATION

As a result of the analyses conducted, we have clearly shown that despite what the literature says, a Congressman's reelectability is not hurt if a base is selected for closure in his district or State. The Contingency Tables showed us that the relationship between an election and a base closure is not strong. While there was a small relationship, perhaps one election, in the House elections, this relationship was likely due to chance. In the Senate, there simply was no

relationship. ANOVA showed us that in both House elections and one Senate election, there was a modest difference (3-4%) in the percent margin of victory between those who had a base selected for closure and those who did not. However, in all cases, this difference was due to chance. Lastly, the Regression Analysis told us that base closure did not have an effect on the outcome of an election, regardless of whether it was for the House or the Senate and regardless of whether the individual won or lost. Therefore, the reelectability of members of Congress for those members having a base selected for closure is the same as for those members not having a base selected for closure. Closure did not make a difference.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Despite what many political scientists such as Lindsay and Mayhew claim, the results of our research on the 1989 and 1991 base closure process clearly prove that the reelectability of Congressmen who had a base selected for closure is not substantively different than the reelectability for the other members of Congress. In the elections we analyzed, how much a member spent per vote to get reelected played the most important part in achieving that objective, whether he had a base selected for closure or not. The fact that a candidate had a base selected for closure mattered little in his attempt at reelection. Congress has been able to act, as a whole, to render individual members blame-proof, with maneuvers such as the Defense Savings Act, and has passed legislation that would ordinarily be considered politically dangerous.

It appears that Congress is willing to give up power to get politically dangerous, but necessary, legislation passed and still get reelected. Congress used the not so uncommon "blame avoidance" for base closures just as it has used it for other issues in the past. Representative Kolbe said on the floor, "It has been talked about that this is a bad delegation of power by the Congress of our

authority here. But the fact is Congress has done this many times in the past..."[80] The fact that members of the United States Congress have legislated their power away, contrary to what the literature says about how legislators act, supports the contention that they are driven by a desire to be reelected. Even though Congress felt that it was politically dangerous to allow bases to close, they knew that it had to be done if they were going to be able to cut back on federal government expenditures. However, the parochial imperative prevented them from fulfilling the obligation. Thus, they resorted to delegating their powers away, as they have done before.

Our examination of the results obtained from four types of analysis serve as concrete evidence to support our thesis that the reelectability of members of Congress is not hurt by base closures. On the contrary, of all the independent variables we used, we saw that base closures tended to have the least effect on a member's reelectability. Before ending this discussion of our research, it is necessary to identify any potential errors in logic in our research. The first questionable issue is whether or not it is too early to determine if base closures had any impact on a member's reelectability. For instance, several bases selected for closure in the 1989 round are still open. It takes roughly four to seven years

---

[80] United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, Congressional Record Vol. 134 No. 101 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 7 July 1988), page H5346.

to close a base, so, if constituents "punish" their elected representative by not reelecting him, does this occur at the time of selection for closure, at the time of the actual closure, or some time later when the economic impact takes effect? Since some of the bases from the first round are now completely closed, we propose that any future study of this subject consider those bases and their respective members of Congress first. On the other hand, this simply may not make a difference.

Second, as new rounds of the base closure process ensue, succeeding studies should also include subsequent elections. While no two elections will be exactly the same, the variables we used will consistently be pertinent in future case studies. Elections then, as now, will be measured in terms of money and margins. However, other election year-specific variables, such as the House check scandal, will be relevant on a much narrower scope. Circumstances will dictate the extent of the use of these variables.

Perhaps the most important lesson learned is that it appears that Congress can manipulate the process to render individual members blame-proof. If this is true, then might it not also be possible for Congress to address other politically dangerous issues, such as reducing entitlement programs, in much the same fashion?

TABLE 1
CONTINGENCY TABLES
1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

Summary Table for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST

Num. Missing	0
DF	2
Chi Square	.755
Chi Square P-Value	.6856
G-Squared	.567
G-Squared P-Value	.7532
Contingency Coef.	.042
Cramer's V	.042

Observed Frequencies for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	10	371	381
LOST	1	15	16
N/A	1	37	38
Totals	12	423	435

Percents of Column Totals for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	83.333	87.707	87.586
LOST	8.333	3.546	3.678
N/A	8.333	8.747	8.736
Totals	100.000	100.000	100.000

Expected Values for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	10.510	370.490	381.000
LOST	.441	15.559	16.000
N/A	1.048	36.952	38.000
Totals	12.000	423.000	435.000

TABLE 2
CONTINGENCY TABLES
1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

Summary Table for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST

Num. Missing	0
DF	2
Chi Square	1.973
Chi Square P-Value	.3729
G-Squared	1.713
G-Squared P-Value	.4247
Contingency Coef.	.067
Cramer's V	.067

Observed Frequencies for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	14	310	324
LOST	4	40	44
N/A	4	63	67
Totals	22	413	435

Percents of Column Totals for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	63.636	75.061	74.483
LOST	18.182	9.685	10.115
N/A	18.182	15.254	15.402
Totals	100.000	100.000	100.000

Expected Values for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	16.386	307.614	324.000
LOST	2.225	41.775	44.000
N/A	3.389	63.611	67.000
Totals	22.000	413.000	435.000

TABLE 3
CONTINGENCY TABLES
1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

Summary Table for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST

Num. Missing	0
DF	2
Chi Square	1.047
Chi Square P-Value	.5923
G-Squared	•
G-Squared P-Value	•
Contingency Coef.	.173
Cramer's V	.176

Observed Frequencies for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	4	26	30
LOST	0	1	1
N/A	1	2	3
Totals	5	29	34

Percents of Column Totals for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	80.000	89.655	88.235
LOST	0.000	3.448	2.941
N/A	20.000	6.897	8.824
Totals	100.000	100.000	100.000

Expected Values for ELECTION 90, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	4.412	25.588	30.000
LOST	.147	.853	1.000
N/A	.441	2.559	3.000
Totals	5.000	29.000	34.000

TABLE 4
CONTINGENCY TABLES
1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

Summary Table for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST

Num. Missing	0
DF	2
Chi Square	1.320
Chi Square P-Value	.5168
G-Squared	1.278
G-Squared P-Value	.5279
Contingency Coef.	.191
Cramer's V	.194

Observed Frequencies for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	7	17	24
LOST	1	4	5
N/A	3	3	6
Totals	11	24	35

Percents of Column Totals for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	63.636	70.833	68.571
LOST	9.091	16.667	14.286
N/A	27.273	12.500	17.143
Totals	100.000	100.000	100.000

Expected Values for ELECTION 92, CLOSURE LIST

	YES	NO	Totals
WON	7.543	16.457	24.000
LOST	1.571	3.429	5.000
N/A	1.886	4.114	6.000
Totals	11.000	24.000	35.000

TABLE 5
CONTINGENCY TABLES
1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

Summary Table for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

Num. Missing	0
DF	1
Chi Square	1.682
Chi Square P-Value	.1947
G-Squared	1.640
G-Squared P-Value	.2003
Contingency Coef.	.062
Phi	.062
Cty. Cor. Chi Square	.997
Cty. Cor. P-Value	.3181
Fisher's Exact P-Value	.2371

Observed Frequencies for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	Totals
YES	7	5	12
NO	168	255	423
Totals	175	260	435

Percents of Column Totals for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	Totals
YES	4.000	1.923	2.759
NO	96.000	98.077	97.241
Totals	100.000	100.000	100.000

Expected Values for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	Totals
YES	4.828	7.172	12.000
NO	170.172	252.828	423.000
Totals	175.000	260.000	435.000

TABLE 6
CONTINGENCY TABLES
1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

Summary Table for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

Num. Missing	0
DF	2
Chi Square	.088
Chi Square P-Value	.9568
G-Squared	•
G-Squared P-Value	•
Contingency Coef.	.014
Cramer's V	.014

Observed Frequencies for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	IND	Totals
YES	8	14	0	22
NO	158	254	1	413
Totals	166	268	1	435

Percents of Column Totals for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	IND	Totals
YES	4.819	5.224	0.000	5.057
NO	95.181	94.776	100.000	94.943
Totals	100.000	100.000	100.000	100.000

Expected Values for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	IND	Totals
YES	8.395	13.554	.051	22.000
NO	157.605	254.446	.949	413.000
Totals	166.000	268.000	1.000	435.000

TABLE 7
CONTINGENCY TABLES
1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

Summary Table for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

Num. Missing	0
DF	1
Chi Square	.234
Chi Square P-Value	.6282
G-Squared	.236
G-Squared P-Value	.6272
Contingency Coef.	.083
Phi	.083
Cty. Cor. Chi Square	0.000
Cty. Cor. P-Value	>.9999
Fisher's Exact P-Value	.6676

Observed Frequencies for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	Totals
YES	3	2	5
NO	14	15	29
Totals	17	17	34

Percents of Column Totals for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	Totals
YES	17.647	11.765	14.706
NO	82.353	88.235	85.294
Totals	100.000	100.000	100.000

Expected Values for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	Totals
YES	2.500	2.500	5.000
NO	14.500	14.500	29.000
Totals	17.000	17.000	34.000

TABLE 8
CONTINGENCY TABLES
1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

Summary Table for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

Num. Missing	0
DF	1
Chi Square	.044
Chi Square P-Value	.8335
G-Squared	.044
G-Squared P-Value	.8337
Contingency Coef.	.036
Phi	.036
Cty. Cor. Chi Square	0.000
Cty. Cor. P-Value	>.9999
Fisher's Exact P-Value	>.9999

Observed Frequencies for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	Totals
YES	5	6	11
NO	10	14	24
Totals	15	20	35

Percents of Column Totals for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	Totals
YES	33.333	30.000	31.429
NO	66.667	70.000	68.571
Totals	100.000	100.000	100.000

Expected Values for CLOSURE LIST, PARTY

	REP	DEM	Totals
YES	4.714	6.286	11.000
NO	10.286	13.714	24.000
Totals	15.000	20.000	35.000

TABLE 9
ANOVA TABLES
1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	157.173	157.173	.155	.6936
Residual	395	399460.827	1011.293		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
38 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE LIST

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	11	37.273	37.484	11.302
NO	386	41.106	31.640	1.610

TABLE 10
ANOVA TABLES
1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	18.063	18.063	.019	.8904
Residual	379	359875.674	949.540		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •

Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE LIST
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	10	41.700	36.353	11.496
NO	371	43.062	30.667	1.592

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	.067	.067	.001	.9749
Residual	14	910.933	65.067		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •

Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE LIST
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	1	-7.000	•	•
NO	15	-7.267	8.066	2.083

TABLE 11
ANOVA TABLES
1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for EXPENDITURES 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 90	1	1078217.172	1078217.172	17.490	<.0001
Residual	394	24288625.333	61646.257		

Model II estimate of between component variance: 35219.78
39 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for EXPENDITURES 90
Effect: ELECTION 90

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	381	392.000	250.558	12.836
LOST	15	665.333	175.744	45.377
N/A	0	.	.	.

ANOVA Table for COST/VOTE 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 90	1	222.821	222.821	22.297	<.0001
Residual	387	3867.465	9.993		

Model II estimate of between component variance: 7.885
46 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for COST/VOTE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	375	4.375	3.159	.163
LOST	14	8.438	3.220	.861
N/A	0	.	.	.

ANOVA Table for SPENDING EDGE 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 90	1	140157.698	140157.698	2.860	.0916
Residual	394	19309998.211	49010.148		

Model II estimate of between component variance: 3157.868
39 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for SPENDING EDGE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	381	319.415	222.974	11.423
LOST	15	220.867	172.655	44.579
N/A	0	.	.	.

TABLE 12
ANOVA TABLES
1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for TENURE 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 90	2	131.829	65.915	1.108	.3311
Residual	432	25692.713	59.474		

Model II estimate of between component variance: .132

Means Table for TENURE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	381	11.512	7.799	.400
LOST	16	9.188	7.222	1.806
N/A	38	12.605	6.973	1.131

Fisher's PLSD for TENURE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Significance Level: 5 %

	Mean Diff.	Crit. Diff	P-Value
WON, LOST	2.324	3.868	.2382
WON, N/A	-1.093	2.579	.4050
LOST, N/A	-3.418	4.517	.1377

TABLE 13
ANOVA TABLES
1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	61.988	61.988	.097	.7554
Residual	366	233446.697	637.833		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
67 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE LIST

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	18	26.500	26.107	6.153
NO	350	28.403	25.213	1.348

TABLE 14
ANOVA TABLES
1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	168.614	168.614	.347	.5560
Residual	322	156250.012	485.248		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •

Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE LIST
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	14	36.929	17.955	4.799
NO	310	33.381	22.183	1.260

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	.111	.111	.001	.9694
Residual	42	3133.775	74.614		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •

Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE LIST
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	4	-10.000	13.466	6.733
NO	40	-10.175	8.149	1.288

TABLE 15
ANOVA TABLES
1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for EXPENDITURES 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 92	1	2240679.859	2240679.859	17.422	<.0001
Residual	345	44370315.784	128609.611		

Model II estimate of between component variance: 49173.938
88 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for EXPENDITURES 92
Effect: ELECTION 92

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	324	563.380	358.882	19.938
LOST	23	886.391	354.779	73.977
N/A	0	•	•	•

ANOVA Table for COST/VOTE 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 92	1	320.731	320.731	32.893	<.0001
Residual	345	3363.998	9.751		

Model II estimate of between component variance: 7.24
88 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for COST/VOTE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	324	4.202	3.083	.171
LOST	23	8.067	3.656	.762
N/A	0	•	•	•

ANOVA Table for SPENDING EDGE 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 92	1	67423.376	67423.376	.604	.4376
Residual	345	38506833.448	111614.010		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
88 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for SPENDING EDGE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	324	424.901	327.818	18.212
LOST	23	368.870	415.371	86.611
N/A	0	•	•	•

TABLE 16
ANOVA TABLES
1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for TENURE 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 92	2	1254.303	627.152	9.751	< 0001
Residual	432	27786.032	64.320		

Model II estimate of between component variance: 6.292

Means Table for TENURE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	324	11.130	8.105	.450
LOST	44	12.114	6.427	.969
N/A	67	15.881	8.518	1.041

Fisher's PLSD for TENURE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Significance Level: 5 %

	Mean Diff.	Crit. Diff	P-Value	
WON, LOST	-.984	2.533	.4455	
WON, N/A	-4.751	2.116	<.0001	S
LOST, N/A	-3.767	3.059	.0159	S

TABLE 17
ANOVA TABLES
1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	198.882	198.882	.206	.6532
Residual	29	27980.667	964.851		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
3 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE LIST

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	4	28.000	26.281	13.140
NO	27	35.556	31.567	6.075

TABLE 18
ANOVA TABLES
1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	280.800	280.800	.297	.5904
Residual	28	26516.000	947.000		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •

Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE LIST
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	4	28.000	26.281	13.140
NO	26	37.000	31.269	6.132

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 90
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST



There were not enough observations to compute this result.

Means Table for % MARGIN 90
Effect: CLOSURE LIST
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST



There were not enough observations to compute this result.

TABLE 19
ANOVA TABLES
1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for EXPENDITURES 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 90	1	4466592.904	4466592.904	.265	.6109
Residual	29	489522362.967	16880081.482		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
3 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for EXPENDITURES 90
Effect: ELECTION 90

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	30	4072.633	4108.538	750.113
LOST	1	6221.000	•	•
N/A	0	•	•	•

ANOVA Table for COST/VOTE 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 90	1	.250	.250	.009	.9254
Residual	29	810.866	27.961		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
3 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for COST/VOTE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	30	7.708	5.288	.965
LOST	1	7.200	•	•
N/A	0	•	•	•

ANOVA Table for SPENDING EDGE 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 90	1	5443357.527	5443357.527	.599	.4452
Residual	29	263501500.667	9086258.644		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
3 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for SPENDING EDGE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	30	2508.333	3014.342	550.341
LOST	1	4880.000	•	•
N/A	0	•	•	•

TABLE 20
ANOVA TABLES
1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 1989 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for TENURE 90

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 90	2	3.098	1.549	.028	.9720
Residual	31	1690.667	54.538		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •

Means Table for TENURE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	30	13.333	7.581	1.384
LOST	1	12.000	•	•
N/A	3	14.000	3.464	2.000

Fisher's PLSD for TENURE 90
Effect: ELECTION 90
Significance Level: 5 %

	Mean Diff.	Crit. Diff	P-Value
WON, LOST	1.333	15.311	.8602
WON, N/A	-.667	9.120	.8825
LOST, N/A	-2.000	17.392	.8161

TABLE 21
ANOVA TABLES
1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	6.577	6.577	.023	.8816
Residual	27	7848.113	290.671		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
6 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE LIST

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	8	16.125	22.184	7.843
NO	21	17.190	14.838	3.238

TABLE 22
ANOVA TABLES
1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	10.601	10.601	.053	.8208
Residual	22	4435.899	201.632		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •

Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE LIST
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	7	20.714	19.431	7.344
NO	17	22.176	11.647	2.825

ANOVA Table for % MARGIN 92
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
CLOSURE LIST	1	115.200	115.200	24.686	.0157
Residual	3	14.000	4.667		

Model II estimate of between component variance: 69.083

Means Table for % MARGIN 92
Effect: CLOSURE LIST
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
YES	1	-16.000	•	•
NO	4	-4.000	2.160	1.080

TABLE 23
ANOVA TABLES
1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for EXPENDITURES 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 92	1	2288300.292	2288300.292	.377	.5447
Residual	26	157916520.958	6073712.345		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
7 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for EXPENDITURES 92
Effect: ELECTION 92

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	24	4097.542	2536.771	517.816
LOST	4	4914.500	1817.215	908.607
N/A	0	•	•	•

ANOVA Table for COST/VOTE 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 92	1	29.434	29.434	.875	.3583
Residual	26	874.930	33.651		

Model II estimate of between component variance: •
7 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for COST/VOTE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	24	7.045	6.079	1.241
LOST	4	4.115	2.886	1.443
N/A	0	•	•	•

ANOVA Table for SPENDING EDGE 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 92	1	13007631.006	13007631.006	6.903	.0142
Residual	26	48994005.958	1884384.845		

Model II estimate of between component variance: 1622140.065
7 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Means Table for SPENDING EDGE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	24	2798.292	1250.454	255.248
LOST	4	850.500	2084.100	1042.050
N/A	0	•	•	•

TABLE 24
ANOVA TABLES
1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 1991 BASE CLOSURES

ANOVA Table for TENURE 92

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
ELECTION 92	2	123.842	61.921	1.181	.3201
Residual	32	1678.158	52.442		

Model II estimate of between component variance: 1.128

Means Table for TENURE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92

	Count	Mean	Std. Dev.	Std. Err.
WON	24	12.708	7.647	1.561
LOST	5	7.400	4.669	2.088
N/A	6	13.000	7.014	2.864

Fisher's PLSD for TENURE 92
Effect: ELECTION 92
Significance Level: 5 %

	Mean Diff.	Crit. Diff	P-Value
WON, LOST	5.308	7.251	.1457
WON, N/A	-.292	6.733	.9302
LOST, N/A	-5.600	8.932	.2108

TABLE 25
CORRELATION OF VARIABLES
FOR 1990 HOUSE ELECTION

Correlation Matrix

	EXPENDITURES 88	COST/VOTE 88	SPENDING EDGE 88
EXPENDITURES 88	1.000	.921	.614
COST/VOTE 88	.921	1.000	.489
SPENDING EDGE 88	.614	.489	1.000

403 observations were used in this computation.
32 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Correlation Matrix

	EXPENDITURES 90	COST/VOTE 90	SPENDING EDGE 90
EXPENDITURES 90	1.000	.892	.766
COST/VOTE 90	.892	1.000	.683
SPENDING EDGE 90	.766	.683	1.000

389 observations were used in this computation.
46 cases were omitted due to missing values.

TABLE 26
CORRELATION OF VARIABLES
FOR 1992 HOUSE ELECTION

Correlation Matrix

	EXPENDITURES 90	COST/VOTE 90	SPENDING EDGE 90
EXPENDITURES 90	1.000	.884	.640
COST/VOTE 90	.884	1.000	.599
SPENDING EDGE 90	.640	.599	1.000

425 observations were used in this computation.
10 cases were omitted due to missing values.

Correlation Matrix

	EXPENDITURES 92	COST/VOTE 92	SPENDING EDGE 92
EXPENDITURES 92	1.000	.885	.754
COST/VOTE 92	.885	1.000	.670
SPENDING EDGE 92	.754	.670	1.000

347 observations were used in this computation.
88 cases were omitted due to missing values.

TABLE 27
CORRELATION OF VARIABLES
FOR 1990 SENATE ELECTION

Correlation Matrix

	EXPENDITURES 84	COST/VOTE 84	SPENDING EDGE 84
EXPENDITURES 84	1.000	.628	.819
COST/VOTE 84	.628	1.000	.773
SPENDING EDGE 84	.819	.773	1.000

33 observations were used in this computation.
One case was omitted due to missing values.

Correlation Matrix

	EXPENDITURES 90	COST/VOTE 90	SPENDING EDGE 90
EXPENDITURES 90	1.000	.273	.894
COST/VOTE 90	.273	1.000	.230
SPENDING EDGE 90	.894	.230	1.000

31 observations were used in this computation.
3 cases were omitted due to missing values.

TABLE 28
CORRELATION OF VARIABLES
FOR 1992 SENATE ELECTION

Correlation Matrix

	EXPENDITURES 86	COST/VOTE 86	SPENDING EDGE 86
EXPENDITURES 86	1.000	-.003	.513
COST/VOTE 86	-.003	1.000	.039
SPENDING EDGE 86	.513	.039	1.000

34 observations were used in this computation.
One case was omitted due to missing values.

Correlation Matrix

	EXPENDITURES 92	COST/VOTE 92	SPENDING EDGE 92
EXPENDITURES 92	1.000	-.142	.578
COST/VOTE 92	-.142	1.000	.140
SPENDING EDGE 92	.578	.140	1.000

28 observations were used in this computation.
7 cases were omitted due to missing values.

TABLE 29
REGRESSION
1990 HOUSE ELECTION vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Regression Summary
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents

Count	361
Num. Missing	74
R	.533
R Squared	.284
Adjusted R Squared	.269
RMS Residual	25.695

ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	7	92262.688	13180.384	19.963	<.0001
Residual	353	233070.193	660.256		
Total	360	325332.881			

Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	26.759	4.871	26.759	5.493	<.0001
% MARGIN 88	.435	.069	.349	6.265	<.0001
COST/VOTE 88	2.995	.872	.235	3.435	.0007
SPENDING EDGE 88	.003	.008	.021	.346	.7298
COST/VOTE 90	-4.808	.636	-.519	-7.560	<.0001
SPENDING EDGE 90	.017	.009	.124	1.786	.0749
CLOSURE	2.464	7.946	.014	.310	.7567
TENURE 90	.028	.185	.007	.150	.8811

TABLE 30
REGRESSION
1990 HOUSE ELECTION WINNERS vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Regression Summary
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON

Count	347
Num. Missing	34
R	.486
R Squared	.236
Adjusted R Squared	.220
RMS Residual	25.838

ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	7	69993.902	9999.129	14.978	<.0001
Residual	339	226315.649	667.598		
Total	346	296309.550			

Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: WON

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	28.377	4.961	28.377	5.721	<.0001
% MARGIN 88	.411	.071	.336	5.821	<.0001
COST/VOTE 88	2.857	.893	.230	3.199	.0015
SPENDING EDGE 88	.005	.008	.036	.563	.5735
COST/VOTE 90	-4.292	.732	-.462	-5.862	<.0001
SPENDING EDGE 90	.009	.011	.072	.891	.3736
CLOSURE	1.747	8.336	.010	.210	.8341
TENURE 90	.040	.189	.011	.213	.8313

TABLE 31
REGRESSION
1990 HOUSE ELECTION LOSERS vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Regression Summary
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST

Count	14
Num. Missing	2
R	.610
R Squared	.373
Adjusted R Squared	•
RMS Residual	5.188

ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	7	95.925	13.704	.509	.8012
Residual	6	161.504	26.917		
Total	13	257.429			

Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 90
Cell: LOST

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	-15.052	8.529	-15.052	-1.765	.1280
% MARGIN 88	.292	.208	.924	1.401	.2107
COST/VOTE 88	1.968	1.716	.971	1.147	.2952
SPENDING EDGE 88	-.012	.021	-.486	-.552	.6008
COST/VOTE 90	-.475	.623	-.344	-.763	.4744
SPENDING EDGE 90	.015	.017	.532	.895	.4055
CLOSURE	2.261	7.617	.136	.297	.7766
TENURE 90	-.045	.226	-.075	-.199	.8492

TABLE 32
REGRESSION
1992 HOUSE ELECTION vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Regression Summary
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents

Count	339
Num. Missing	96
R	.638
R Squared	.407
Adjusted R Squared	.394
RMS Residual	18.321

ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	7	76238.491	10891.213	32.449	<.0001
Residual	331	111098.358	335.645		
Total	338	187336.850			

Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	29.453	2.963	29.453	9.940	<.0001
% MARGIN 90	.221	.035	.291	6.248	<.0001
COST/VOTE 90	1.663	.459	.225	3.623	.0003
SPENDING EDGE 90	.004	.005	.044	.744	.4573
COST/VOTE 92	-5.773	.432	-.807	-13.376	<.0001
SPENDING EDGE 92	.026	.004	.371	5.900	<.0001
CLOSURE	-1.240	4.584	-.012	-.271	.7869
TENURE 92	-.111	.132	-.037	-.843	.4000

TABLE 33
REGRESSION
1992 HOUSE ELECTION WINNERS vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Regression Summary
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON

Count	316
Num. Missing	8
R	.576
R Squared	.332
Adjusted R Squared	.316
RMS Residual	18.177

ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	7	50488.411	7212.630	21.830	<.0001
Residual	308	101764.180	330.403		
Total	315	152252.592			

Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: WON

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	30.310	3.014	30.310	10.058	<.0001
% MARGIN 90	.231	.036	.324	6.344	<.0001
COST/VOTE 90	1.471	.475	.216	3.099	.0021
SPENDING EDGE 90	.005	.006	.064	.968	.3337
COST/VOTE 92	-5.082	.499	-.719	-10.193	<.0001
SPENDING EDGE 92	.020	.005	.303	4.234	<.0001
CLOSURE	3.790	5.008	.036	.757	.4498
TENURE 92	-.147	.132	-.054	-1.109	.2682

TABLE 34
REGRESSION
1992 HOUSE ELECTION LOSERS vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Regression Summary
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST

Count	23
Num. Missing	21
R	.617
R Squared	.381
Adjusted R Squared	.092
RMS Residual	4.867

ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	7	218.478	31.211	1.318	.3078
Residual	15	355.261	23.684		
Total	22	573.739			

Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents
Split By: ELECTION 92
Cell: LOST

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	-3.265	5.101	-3.265	-.640	.5318
% MARGIN 90	.041	.043	.263	.939	.3624
COST/VOTE 90	1.042	.618	.577	1.688	.1122
SPENDING EDGE 90	-.001	.008	-.057	-.160	.8752
COST/VOTE 92	-1.134	.554	-.812	-2.048	.0585
SPENDING EDGE 92	.005	.005	.368	.916	.3739
CLOSURE	-.718	3.680	-.048	-.195	.8479
TENURE 92	-.147	.289	-.141	-.509	.6182

TABLE 35
REGRESSION
1990 SENATE ELECTION vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Regression Summary
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents

Count	30
Num. Missing	4
R	.686
R Squared	.470
Adjusted R Squared	.301
RMS Residual	25.741

ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	7	12926.032	1846.576	2.787	.0310
Residual	22	14577.335	662.606		
Total	29	27503.367			

Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 90 vs. 7 Independents

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	42.326	17.227	42.326	2.457	.0224
% MARGIN 84	.565	.297	.380	1.905	.0700
EXPENDITURES 84	-.002	.003	-.206	-.514	.6124
COST/VOTE 84	2.082	1.564	.412	1.331	.1967
COST/VOTE 90	-3.408	1.166	-.585	-2.922	.0079
SPENDING EDGE 90	-7.094E-5	.003	-.007	-.022	.9824
CLOSURE	-1.171	15.937	-.013	-.073	.9421
TENURE 90	-.095	.777	-.022	-.123	.9034

TABLE 36
REGRESSION
1992 SENATE ELECTION vs 7 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Regression Summary
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents

Count	27
Num. Missing	8
R	.631
R Squared	.398
Adjusted R Squared	.176
RMS Residual	14.097

ANOVA Table
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F-Value	P-Value
Regression	7	2497.621	356.803	1.795	.1468
Residual	19	3775.786	198.726		
Total	26	6273.407			

Regression Coefficients
% MARGIN 92 vs. 7 Independents

	Coefficient	Std. Error	Std. Coeff.	t-Value	P-Value
Intercept	25.439	9.300	25.439	2.735	.0131
% MARGIN 86	.892	.345	.819	2.585	.0182
EXPENDITURES 86	-.002	.002	-.362	-1.285	.2142
COST/VOTE 86	-.013	.750	-.004	-.017	.9863
COST/VOTE 92	.320	.743	.120	.431	.6713
SPENDING EDGE 92	.002	.003	.165	.590	.5619
CLOSURE	-.587	7.517	-.017	-.078	.9386
TENURE 92	-1.798	.668	-.858	-2.693	.0144

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arnold, R. Douglas, Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

Barone, Michael, and Ujifusa, Grant, The Almanac of American Politics, (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993).

Congressional Districts in the 1980s, The, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1983).

Congressional Quarterly Almanac, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1965, 1966, 1976, 1977, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990).

Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, Base Realignments and Closures, (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988).

Dougherty, Sandra A., Army Base Closures: A Status Report, AUSA Background Report #35, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 1991).

Fisher, Louis, President and Congress: Power and Policy, (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

Gordon, Edward F., Captain, USN, Base Closure and Realignment, A Case Study, (Washington, DC: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992).

Haycock, Keith A. and others, Abacus Concepts, Statview, (Berkeley, CA: Abacus Concepts, Inc., 1992).

Hoffman, Mark S., ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1993, (New York: Pharos Books, 1993).

Kuntz, Phil, "House Panels Differ Over Base Closing Bill," Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 11June 1988.

Leonard, Hugh R., Jr., Colonel, USA, Handling the Hot Potato: Evolution and Analysis of the Base Closing Decision Process, (Washington, DC: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992).

Lewellyn, William E., Colonel, USA, An Examination of Congressional Motives for Impacting on Military Strategy, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 1991).

Lindsay, James M., Congress and Nuclear Weapons, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991),.

Mayhew, David R., Congress: The Electoral Connection, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

Mills, Mike, "Members Go on the Offensive to Defend Bases," Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 11 June 1988.

New York Times, 23 October 1987.

Rasher, Donald C., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Closing Military Bases to Generate Cost Savings and Increase Military Efficiency, (Washington, DC: National War College, 1986).

Sundquist, James L., The Decline and Resurgence of Congress, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981).

United States Congress, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Military Construction and Stockpiles, Department of Defense Base Realignment Policy, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1978).

United States Congress, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, National Debt Retirement Act of 1982, House Document No. 97-240, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1982).

United States Congress, 98th Congress, 1st Session, Oversight of GSA's Federal Surplus Real Property Disposal Program, Senate Document No. 98-655, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1984).

United States Congress, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on Armed Services, Base Closure, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988).

United States Department of Defense, Base Closure and Realignment Report, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1991).

United States Department of Defense, President's Economic Adjustment Committee, Office of Economic Adjustment, 25 Years of Reuse: Summary of Completed Military Base Economic Adjustment Projects, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986).

Wilcox, Francis O., Congress, The Executive, and Foreign Policy, (New York: Harper &Row, 1971).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

		No. of Copies
1.	Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22304-6145	2
2.	Library, Code 52 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	2
3.	N51, The Pentagon, Room 4E566 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, DC 20350	1
4.	N31, The Pentagon, Room 4E572 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, DC 20350	1
5.	N511, The Pentagon, Room 4D563 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Washington, DC 20350	1
6.	Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bn) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
7.	Dr. Paul N. Stockton (Code NS/Sc) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	10

8. Dr. Dana P. Eyre 1
(Code NS/Ey)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943

9. Major Charles L. Wilson 1
995 Pomona Road #51
Corona, CA 91720

10. Captain James L. Weingartner 1
597-F Michelson Road
Monterey, CA 93940

11. Representative Richard K. Armey 1
301 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

12. Representative William H. Natcher 1
2333 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

13. Department of the Army 1
US Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWG-AP (MAJ Wilson)
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

14. Headquarters Air Force Office of Special Investigations 1
Bolling AFB
Washington, DC 20332

15. Dr. Glenn Robinson 1
(Code NS/Rb)
Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, CA 93943

14. Captain Robert Miranda 1
AFOSI 52 FIS
PSC 90 Box 1518 (JUSMAAT)
APO, AE 09822-1518 ANKARA